Should the Law Preserve Party Control?
Litigation Investment, Insurance Law,
and Double Standards by Sebok, Anthony J.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 56 | Issue 3 Article 4
Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation
Investment, Insurance Law, and Double Standards
Anthony J. Sebok
Copyright c 2015 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, Insurance Law, and
Double Standards, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 833 (2015), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol56/
iss3/4
SHOULD THE LAW PRESERVE PARTY CONTROL?
LITIGATION INVESTMENT, INSURANCE LAW, AND
DOUBLE STANDARDS
ANTHONY J. SEBOK*
ABSTRACT
Litigation investment, sometimes known as litigation finance, is
increasingly accepted around the world. Once prohibited as champer-
ty, litigation investment is now embraced in England, Canada, and
Australia, as well as in many civil law nations. In the United States,
the development of a robust market for investment in litigation has
been met by various objections. One objection is that litigation invest-
ment interferes with the autonomy of lawyers. A second objection is
that it promotes frivolous litigation.
This Article takes up a popular argument against litigation
investment: the legal system should not encourage parties to sell their
control over litigation that would vindicate their rights. This criti-
cism is based on an unspoken assumption that private law theory
requires party control to stay with the original rightholder and
contracts that allow the sale of party control to a stranger should be
struck down, either for being contrary to public policy or for some
other legal basis.
* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Lynn Baker, Tom
Baker, Mauro Bussani, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Myriam Gilles, John Goldberg, Jon Molot,
Adam Scales, Daniel Schwarcz, Selvyn Seidel, Charlie Silver, Maya Steinitz, Jeff Stempel,
Brad Wendel, Ben Zipursky, and audiences at workshops at Cardozo School of Law, Cornell
Law School, and Washington and Lee University School of Law for useful comments and
criticisms. Arielle Disick, Cardozo School of Law Class of 2015, provided research assistance.
The author served as Academic Co-Reporter to the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Working
Group on Alternative Litigation Finance and has consulted for Burford, a litigation funding
firm, but none of the views in this Article are necessarily those of the ABA or Burford.
833
834 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:833
Although I briefly consider justifications rooted in moral philoso-
phy, which support the view that party control should not be sold, I
focus mostly on arguments based on the common law. I propose that
arguments against the sale of party control based on the structure or
nature of the common law are anachronistic. As society evolved,
courts and legal commentators abandoned such arguments, which
once constrained the sale of party control before the middle of the
nineteenth century. Liberal attitudes about the sale of party control
were first seen in the gradual elimination of rules limiting the
assignment of choses in action. Liberalization was next seen in
insurance. I will demonstrate that as the role of insurance in society
grew, courts reinterpreted common law practices to permit the
alienation of control of litigation for profit in various contexts,
including subrogation and liability insurance.
This Article concludes that by looking at the evolution of insurance
law, we can learn how rigid attitudes about the relationship between
victims and wrongdoers can be bent to fit social needs. The Article
takes note of the growing consensus in the United States, as well as
in other common law nations, regarding the social benefits of
litigation investment. Finally, I argue that given the appetite for
litigation investment among the public, courts and policymakers
should be skeptical of arguments that use party control as a justifica-
tion to block this new form of financing for lawsuits.
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INTRODUCTION
Along with other common law nations, the United States is
experiencing a dramatic increase in litigation investment.1 Litiga-
tion investment is a contract between strangers whereby one takes
an interest in the future recovery of the other’s lawsuit in exchange
for something of value.2 As litigation investment has become more
common, drawing the attention of sophisticated financial institu-
tions, it has also garnered some critical attention as well.3 Among
the many arguments against litigation investment is that it
impermissibly interferes with the control of litigation by the parties
to the dispute.4 This Article responds to the “control argument” by
making two points: first, that the common law permits parties to
alienate their control over litigation by contract in numerous
contexts; and second, that the fact that the common law has
enforced contracts permitting the alienation of control over litiga-
tion in contexts other than litigation investment (specifically the
insurance context) should make us skeptical of the argument that
litigation investment represents a new threat to civil litigation as it
is practiced in the United States today.5
1. See Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 711, 713-19 (2014) (describing the commercial litigation investment market).
According to the New York City Bar Association, “the aggregate amount of litigation financing
outstanding is estimated to exceed $ 1 billion.” Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 2011-2 (2011), available at http://perma.cc/PY3Q-4ADT (discussing
third-party litigation financing).
2. “[C]hamperty is maintaining a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”
Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 273 (S.C. 2000) (quoting In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978)).
3. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Lawsuit Loans Add New Risk for the Injured, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A1; Binyamin Appelbaum, Lobby Battle over Loans for Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, at B1; Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on Lawsuits, Investors
Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A1; Investing in Someone Else’s Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (Nov. 15, 2010), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/7NV8-RFQU]. 
4. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING
TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (2009), available at
http://perma.cc/3S5J-59JR (“[Third-party funding thus] places the power to make strategic
decisions about [litigation] in the hands of the funder.”).
5. See Anthony J. Sebok, What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Control?, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2941, 2955-56 (2014).
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Litigation investment, as the next Part explains in greater detail,
occurs when nonlawyers invest for profit in litigation in which they
otherwise have no interest.6 “[L]itigation is the expenditure of mon-
ey by a party to enforce (or defend) an existing or anticipated legal
claim, when the money is used either to purchase the services of an
attorney in anticipation of an appearance before, or submission of
materials to, an adjudicative body.”7 At the end of the twentieth
century, some critics argued that the American litigation system
needed reform because plaintiffs’ attorneys thought of litigation as
an investment, which increased the amount of socially unproductive
and frivolous claims.8 “Litigation investment is now the object of a
similar sort of critique based on the fear that litigation will be
subject to a new round of commercialization.”9
6. For an excellent review, see STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION
FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 1, 13 (2010), http://www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [http://perma.cc/
UV3V-UWLP], and MAX VOLSKY, INVESTING IN JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL FINANCE,
LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION FUNDING 25 (2013).
7. Sebok, supra note 5, at 2939. Under this definition, litigation investment includes
arbitration. See generally LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY
FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2012); Catherine A. Rogers, Gamblers, Loan Sharks
& Third-Party Funders, in ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014). This definition
might be too narrow for some. “Any investment of time and money, even by a layperson—such
as the drafting of a demand letter to a debtor by a creditor—could, in theory, count as
litigation.” Sebok, supra note 5, at 2939 n.4 (citing Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Con-
tentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 11-18 (1983)). The definition used in this
Article tracks conventional practice. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation
Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171 (2014) (reviewing limitations of market for litigation investment).
8. Sebok, supra note 5, at 2939. “[T]he plaintiffs’ bar has strong monetary incentives to
create liability through repeated litigation of presently non-meritorious claims.” Id. at 2939-40
n.5 (quoting Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 630 (2012)); see also WILLIAM HALTOM
& MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS
(2004); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FREE LEGAL
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatches from the Tort Wars, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (2007) (reviewing TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH
(2005)) (discussing tort reform and the attack on the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar). Nora
Engstrom gives a very different evaluation of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ bar, arguing that
the settlement mills operated by lawyers with an “entrepreneurial (rather than professional)
orientation” serve a valuable social function. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and
Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 810, 819 (2011).
9. Sebok, supra note 5, at 2939 n.6.
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The plan of this Article is as follows: In Part I, I will explain what
litigation investment is and its current status in American law. I
also will review the three major arguments against litigation
investment, which I call the “consequentialist,” “perfectionist,” and
“rule-of-law” critiques. In Part II, I will further examine the rule-of-
law critique. Although rooted in the tort reform movement of the
1980s and 1990s,10 which was concerned primarily with plaintiffs’
lawyers’ abuse of the civil justice system, the rule-of-law critique of
litigation investment is concerned with protecting the civil justice
system from outside forces such as investment firms. If the law
discourages (or prohibits) parties from giving away control over the
litigation to strangers who have a financial stake in the outcome,
the proper functioning of the courts—including the professional
independence of plaintiffs’ lawyers—will be compromised. Part III
takes up the question of whether party control over litigation was
ever central to the proper functioning of the civil justice system, as
the critics seem to assume. In this Part, I will demonstrate that
courts have permitted parties to give up control over their claims in
litigation and have not blocked the party’s choice because it violated
a formal legal value intrinsic to the law known as party control. In
fact, in the context of insurance law, courts have permitted strang-
ers to take total control over a party’s litigation.11 My point is that
we should be skeptical of arguments against litigation investment
that are based on principles rejected in other areas of tort and
insurance law, although the problem of reconciling such a contradic-
tion should not be minimized.12 My larger goal is to shift the debate
10. See generally F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform”
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437 (2006).
11. The liberal attitude toward the alienation of party control in the insurance context is
not often explicitly justified in judicial opinions. Insurance law scholars have pointed out that
in a legal regime that imposes a duty to defend on insurers, it is rational for insureds to
contract away party control in exchange for other benefits, such as coverage. See, e.g.,
Michelle Boardman, Insurers Defend and Third Parties Fund: A Comparison of Litigation
Participation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 673, 687-89 (2012); James M. Fischer, Insurer-Policyholder
Interests, Defense Counsel’s Professional Duties, and the Allocation of Power to Control the
Defense, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 44-48 (2008); Charles Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel
Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1596-98 (1994).
12. As I will suggest in the Article’s conclusion, courts should adopt a liberal attitude
toward the alienation of party control in litigation investment for the same reasons they have
adopted liberal attitudes toward the alienation of party control in insurance. The reasons for
this adoption are not just respect of freedom of contract and efficiency; although those are the
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about litigation investment away from the alleged risk it poses to
party control toward the question of how to regulate investment in
litigation so that it (1) provides increased access to the courts while
(2) protecting both parties to the litigation investment contract from
opportunistic behavior by the other.13
I. LITIGATION INVESTMENT AND ITS CRITICS
Litigation can be financed with funds from various sources.14 In
common law systems, the most likely source of funds is the litigant
herself. On both the plaintiff and defendant side, parties can spend
their own money to pay attorneys, purchase litigation support
services, and cover litigation-related expenses. Under the “English
Rule,” the prevailing party can recover these costs from the losing
party; although it must be noted that recovery of legal expenses is
not guaranteed when cases settle because these may be themselves
the subject of adjustment.15 In the United States, where each side
justifications that many insurance law scholars have identified most recently. See supra note
11. Beyond simple freedom of contract lies the larger point that like insurance, litigation
investment is a “social instrument.” Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1495 (2010). Following
Stempel, this Article takes the position that just as courts promoted freedom of contract in
insurance in order to achieve larger social and economic ends, courts should uphold freedom
of contract to alienate control in litigation finance in order to achieve similar social and
economic ends. Id. at 1580-82. As Lord Neuberger’s 2012 lecture suggests, the social benefits
of a regulated but broad market in litigation investment have been recognized in other
common law systems and are likely to have parallels in the United States. Lord Neuberger,
President, Sup. Ct., U.K., Harbour Litigation Funding First Annual Lecture: From Barretry,
Maintenance, and Champerty to Litigation Funding (May 8, 2013), http://www.supremecourt.
uk/docs/speech-130508.pdf [http://perma. cc/KMY4-ZL4H].
13. For a discussion of legal approaches for the protection of the parties to the litigation
investment contract, see generally Anthony J. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the
Litigation-Investment Agreement: The Choice Between Tort and Contract Norms When the
Deal Breaks Down, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1831 (2013). 
14. For a broad review of sources of civil litigation resources in the United States and
Europe, see NEW HORIZONS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL
LITIGATION IN EUROPE (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010), and THE COSTS AND FUNDING
OF CIVIL LITIGATION (Christopher Hodges et al. eds., 2010).
15. See generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation:
What Does the Empirical Literature Really Say?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1946 (2002) (discussing
the “English Rule” and the “American Rule” of fee shifting). Courts play an increasingly
important role in deciding which costs may be shifted to the losing party in England, which
has led to an increase in satellite litigation about costs after the primary litigation is
completed. See LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL
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bears its own costs absent certain contractual or statutory cost-
shifting provisions, litigation costs mean that as a technical matter
self-funded prevailing parties are not made whole. Defendants and
plaintiffs pay a surcharge even when they are legally in the right
because of the existence of good-faith resistance from their oppo-
nent.
Some forms of third-party litigation funding in the United States
are pervasive features of contemporary life. Most familiar is the
plaintiff’s attorney who offers to represent a party in litigation on a
contingent fee basis. Even though at one time this practice was
strictly prohibited in the United States, contingency fees have
become a mainstay of American legal culture and, even when
criticized, are recognized as the chief means by which lower- and
middle-class persons can secure plaintiff-side representation.16 Even
corporations use contingent fee agreements and are doing so with
increasing frequency.17 A second group of third-party litigation
funders are insurance companies. Liability insurance, as will be
explained in Part III.D, is really two kinds of insurance sold
together: “litigation” insurance, which offers to pay for the cost of
the insured’s litigation under certain circumstances, and “judgment”
insurance, which offers to pay for the cost of the insured’s legal
liabilities under certain circumstances. The two are not unrelated,
which is why they are sold together, although in theory they could
be broken apart. Someone confident that she will never legally
wrong another party might want insurance to cover only the costs
of proving that she is not liable. Another person, confident that if he
legally wrongs another it will be in circumstances so clear that there
would be no point contesting the judgment, might want insurance
REPORT 29-38, 43-45 (2009), available at http://perma.cc/43UY-PL59 (discussing the “Costs
War”).
16. See generally Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998)
(discussing the development of the contingency fee contract and noting that contingency fee
contracts are pro-plaintiff); Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency
Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739 (2002) (reviewing the history of contingency fees in the United
States).
17. Contingent fees (sometimes referred to as “alternative fees”) are no longer the
exception among the firms ranked by the Am Law 100 survey. See Drew Combs, The Am Law
100 2010: Alternative Fee Reality, AM. L. DAILY (May 10, 2010, 7:01 PM), http://amlawdaily.
typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/05/altfeereality.html [http://perma.cc/W4UG-XKSS].
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to cover only his liability. One could even imagine insurance for
persons or corporations who expect to be plaintiffs but want to
hedge the cost of legal representation; this need could be met with
an insurance product that covers only plaintiff-side litigation costs.18
Legal aid is a third type of third-party litigation funding.19 Even
though legal aid comprises an important source of civil litigation
funds for liability claims in Europe, in the United States legal aid
is not a significant source of funds for legal claims outside of
housing and civil rights.20 Legal aid probably occupies a larger role
in America in the public’s imagination than in the reality of the
legal system.21
This Article will focus on a fourth kind of third-party funder of
litigation: private-sector firms that invest in litigation for profit.22
Although investment in litigation is not a new phenomenon, re-
cently investment litigation has developed into an industry with a
significant presence and a discrete identity. The emergence of
litigation investment firms in the United States parallels the rise of
similar firms around the world, in both common law and civilian
systems.23 This Article will refer to this last kind of third-party
funding as “litigation investment.”24
18. Legal expenses insurance is not traditional liability insurance because it pays for the
costs of being a plaintiff. This insurance is available in Europe. See Michael Faure & Jef De
Mot, Comparing Third-Party Financing of Litigation and Legal Expenses Insurance, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 743, 746-51 (2012).
19. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES ET AL., LITIGATION FUNDING: STATUS AND ISSUES RESEARCH
REPORT 17-18 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/3A6P-PZL4.
20. ALAN W. HOUSEMAN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED
STATES—AN UPDATE FOR 2013, at 5 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/YL9R-RUSF.
21. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32
UCLA L. REV. 474, 477, 508, 541-42 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2011, at B1.
23. See generally VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMS: LAW, POLICY & FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US (2008).
24. At various times in the history of American law, courts did not always draw such neat
distinctions between different kinds of third-party funding of litigation. A century ago, most
courts treated the contingent fee as legally identical to litigation investment by a stranger.
See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 99-100 (2011). As late as
the 1960s, some state courts allowed civil rights groups to be prosecuted under laws
prohibiting litigation investment for profit. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-26 (1963)
(reversing Virginia lower courts that had upheld such a statute).
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Although a complete review of the legal and economic landscape
of the litigation investment industry is not possible in this Article,
the structure of the industry can be laid out in a few broad strokes.25
First, the industry has two quite different branches.26 One branch
consists of firms that invest in relatively low-dollar-value personal
injury claims.27 This part of the industry is known as “consumer”
litigation investment.28 Consumer litigation investment consists of
firms purchasing a partial interest in the proceeds of litigation.29
The purchase is not of a portion of the legal claim that might
produce the proceeds. Instead, the purchase is of the proceeds that
will come into existence if the legal claim—and a number of other
contingencies—are satisfactorily resolved.30 Consumer litigation
investment is not allowed in all jurisdictions in the United States.
There is some controversy over whether, even when consumer
litigation investment is legally permissible, it nonetheless falls
within the statutory definition of consumer credit, and therefore
should be limited by the jurisdiction’s relevant usury laws.31
Further, some might quibble with the use of the term “invest” in
connection with consumer litigation investment because the funds
paid to purchase litigation proceeds are almost never used for
litigation expenses, such as the lawyer’s time or the costs associated
with investigating and trying a claim.32 This is a consequence of the
fact that almost all personal injury suits are handled through
contingent fee arrangements, which means that the cases in which
25. For a review of the legal environment, see Sebok, supra note 24, at 99-100, and Maya
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1268, 1333 (2011). For a review of the economic and business environment, see GARBER, supra
note 6, at 9-16, and Molot, supra note 7, 65-66.
26. GARBER, supra note 6, at 9, 13.
27. See id. at 9, 12.
28. Id. at 9.
29. See id. at 9, 12.
30. The proceeds of litigation come into existence when received as funds by the party
selling the interest; not when there is a final judgment determining the legal rights of the
party selling the interest to the litigation investor. See id. at 9-10, 12.
31. See Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., LLC v. Suthers, No. 12CA1130, 2013 Colo. App. LEXIS 780,
at *4-6 (May 23, 2013) (holding that litigation investment violates state consumer credit law),
cert. granted in part, and cert. denied in part, No. 13SC497, 2014 Colo. LEXIS 19 (Jan. 21,
2014); Sebok, supra note 24, at 98-102 (review of legal status of litigation investment among
the states).
32. See GARBER, supra note 6, at 12.
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consumer litigation investment occurs are already funded by
another third party, the plaintiff’s attorney.33 So why do parties sell
litigation proceeds to consumer litigation investment firms? Accord-
ing to the consumer litigation investment firms, consumers use the
money to pay for living expenses.34 Because the bargaining strategy
for settlement often produces delay until the so-called “eve of trial,”
plaintiffs are in a better position to maximize settlement value if
they are not forced to settle early due to a need for money.35
The other branch consists of firms that invest in high-dollar
commercial claims, typically involving millions of dollars, and
sometimes more. This part of the industry is known as “commercial”
litigation investment.36 Like in consumer litigation investment,
commercial litigation investment consists of firms purchasing
litigation proceeds. Unlike consumer litigation investment, the
funds paid to purchase litigation proceeds are typically used for
litigation expenses.37 Even though commercial litigation investment
can involve virtually any sort of claim, it often involves commercial
contract and tort disputes, as well as intellectual property and qui
tam claims.38 For a few reasons, the legal status of commercial
litigation investment is not identical to that of consumer litigation
investment. Although the doctrines of champerty generally do not
distinguish between the consumer and commercial purposes of legal
investment and, therefore, treat all such contracts as legal or illegal
depending on their structure, consumer credit laws (as their name
implies) do not typically apply to commercial litigation investment.39
33. This is a product of certain features of contingency fee practice in the United States.
In addition to the United States, there is third-party consumer litigation investment in
England, Canada, and Australia. In fact, in Canada and Australia consumer class action
litigation heavily depends on litigation investment. See Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for
Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation
Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 113-28 (2013).
34. See GARBER, supra note 6, at 16.
35. See Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law, 43
AKRON L. REV. 677, 692 (2010).
36. See GARBER, supra note 6, at 13.
37. See id. at 15.
38. See id. at 13; Kalajdzic et al., supra note 33, at 132-33.
39. See GARBER, supra note 6, at 18 n.4; Sebok, supra note 24, at 98-102.
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A. Historical Rejection of Litigation Investment
For centuries, litigation investment was prohibited in the
common law.40 Originally, the prohibition was seen as a companion
to the larger and more sweeping prohibition of the assignment of
choses of action. This doctrine, although analytically separate, was
supported by the larger, general anxiety over the “commercializa-
tion” of litigation in premodern and modern societies.41 Today, the
few limitations on assignment are an anachronistic remnant of this
earlier period and only rarely emerge to interfere with or block the
fluid transfer of claims in complex commercial markets.42 The larger
anxiety over the commercialization of litigation persists in American
society, however, and has its fullest expression along the fault line
of champerty law: state law permitting partial ownership of
proceeds—and under what circumstances—reveals how freely
investment in litigation can occur in that jurisdiction.43
Resistance to litigation investment has been broad and varied
over the centuries, starting with the Romans.44 Blackstone strongly
opposed any form of litigation investment. He objected that such
investors were simply “officious intermeddlers” who would disturb
the “repose” of defendants, and he repeated the concern shared by
many in the English bar, that wealthy and titled elites would
encourage their tenants and retainers to sue their rivals by
supporting the costs of the suits—and maybe even rewarding the
tenant or retainer with a side payment.45 Radin hypothesized that
some of the resistance was rooted even more deeply than that and
reflected Christianity’s vestigial hostility to litigation and secular
courts.46 As these arguments fell aside, they were replaced by
40. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 50-53 (1936).
41. See Sebok, supra note 24, at 98-100.
42. Id. at 114-15.
43. See id. at 107-20.
44. See Radin, supra note 40, at 52-56 (describing Roman legal prohibitions on
champerty).
45. See Casserleigh v. Wood, 59 P. 1024, 1026 (Colo. App. 1900) (“[In Blackstone’s time,
the wealthy and powerful] would buy up claims, and, by means of their exalted and influential
positions, overawe the courts, secure unjust and unmerited judgments, and oppress those
against whom their anger might be directed.”); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *134-36 (1769).
46. See Radin, supra note 40, at 58 (“[L]itigiousness ... [was] an indication of a quarrelsome
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arguments that reflected the concerns of the newly emerging market
economy.47 The arguments Radin encountered in 1936 have been
supplanted by a new generation that are different—on the surface
at least—from the old arguments.48 The modern arguments can be
grouped into three categories: (1) consequentialist, (2) perfectionist,
or (3) rule of law (or jurisprudential).
B. The Three Modern Critiques
1. The Consequentialist Critique
The consequentialist argument typically focuses on the putative,
perverse incentives created by the introduction of self-interested
third parties in litigation, who are not themselves lawyers. The fear
is that by allowing self-interested nonlawyers to support litigation,
the quality of litigation will decline, thus producing an increase in
the amount of litigation that is fraudulent, frivolous, or specious.49
Needless to say, many questionable assumptions are built into
the consequentialist argument. Because this Article is not the ap-
propriate place to engage them, it may be more efficient to simply
note that most, if not all, of the assumptions that are behind the
consequentialist argument parallel the assumptions behind the ar-
guments made by critics of the entrepreneurial plaintiffs bar.50
The critics of American civil litigation argue that the contingent fee
produces lawyer-driven litigation that is more likely to be fraudu-
lent, frivolous, or specious compared to a system in which lawyers
and un-Christian spirit.”).
47. Id. at 72 (noting that new arguments against champerty included its tendency to
induce improper litigation, the likelihood that claimholders would be subjected to “hard
bargains,” and its tendency to degrade the profession).
48. See, e.g., Darren McKinney, Letter to the Editor, Lawsuit Loans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/opinion/lweb23loans.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/
LG8K-BWPS]. “[T]he ancient Greeks and Romans to Western lawmakers and jurists
throughout much of the 20th century” prohibited litigation investment. Id. The traditional
view was “encapsulated succinctly in an 1850 law lecture by Abraham Lincoln: ‘Never stir up
litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does this.’” Id.
49. See Jeremy Kidd, To Fund or Not to Fund: The Need for Second-Best Solutions to the
Litigation Finance Dilemma, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 613, 627-31 (2012).
50. See, e.g., LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 24-28 (1994);
JEFFREY O’CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 8-28 (1979).
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do not directly share in the recoveries of their clients.51 The key
assumption shared by the consequentialist argument against
litigation investment and the consequentialist argument against the
contingent fee is that persons who seek to maximize their return on
investment in litigation will not select claims based on their
merit—or social value—but on their expected return as an invest-
ment. Further, some persons who seek to maximize their return on
investment in litigation will either unconsciously or deliberately
make legal claims that are invalid.52 It does not matter at this point
in the argument why it is rational for investors in claims to put
forward invalid claims; it may be that that the legal system is
incapable of identifying invalid claims, or that even if the legal
system is capable of identifying them in theory, in practice it will
not because the relevant “transaction costs” are so high that it is
cheaper for defendants to settle (that is, to pay a portion) of a zero-
value claim than to defeat a zero-value claim on the merits.53
A variant of the consequentialist argument is that self-interested
third parties will exploit vulnerable claimholders, taking from them
a huge portion of their expected recovery in their litigation in
exchange for a paltry amount.54 This version of the consequentialist
51. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Procedural Tort Reform: Lessons from Other Nations, 19
REG. 71, 79 (1996) (arguing that the contingent fee “encourages attorneys to engage in
speculative litigation in the hopes of landing the occasional large jackpot”); LAWRENCE J.
MCQUILLAN ET AL., PAC. RESEARCH INST., JACKPOT JUSTICE: THE TRUE COST OF AMERICA’S
TORT SYSTEM 26-28 (2007), available at http://perma.cc/Z7U7-9SGX.
52. See Kidd, supra note 49, at 630; Geoffrey J. Lysaught & D. Scott Hazelgrove, Economic
Implications of Third-Party Litigation Financing on the U.S. Civil Justice System, 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 645, 662-65 (2012).
53. See Frank B. Cross, Tort Law and the American Economy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 28, 37
(2011) (“Defendants may choose to settle wholly illegitimate claims simply because the costs
of litigation exceeded the settlement payments.”).
54. “[T]he main justification for [litigation investment] is that the practice is
‘proconsumer,’ but the reality is that [it] benefits only one group of people—the investors—and
it does so at the expense of all the other parties involved in litigation.” Public Policy
Implications of Lawsuit Lending and Its Effects on the Civil Justice System: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, 2012 Leg., 82d Sess. (Tex. 2012) (testimony
of John H. Beisner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP on behalf of the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform); see General Thurbert Baker, Paying to Play: Inside The
Ethics and Implications of Third-Party Litigation Funding, 23 WIDENER L.J. 229, 232 (2013)
(state attorney generals need to recognize “the anti-consumer nature of these financial
products”); Martin J. Estevao, Note, The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect
and Inform Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 468-69 (2013); see also Jenna Wims
Hashway, Litigation Loansharks: A History of Litigation Lending and a Proposal to Bring
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argument is made almost exclusively against consumer litigation
investment, and is really a form of paternalism. This argument is
the same one that has been made to support state-imposed limita-
tions on various self-regarding actions in the marketplace, such as
minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, or limitations on
subprime mortgages and payday lending.55 Jeremy Bentham was
one of the first to observe the family resemblance between the
paternalistic laws prohibiting usury and champerty.56 In the case of
litigation investment, the paternalistic argument is worth consider-
ing only if unrestricted sale of litigation proceeds by competent and
fully informed adults leads, as an empirical matter, to the destitu-
tion of the seller. Even then, as John Stuart Mill would point out, it
is not clear why—unless the burden of the consequent destitution
impacts the seller’s family or society—the state should step in to
interfere with the seller’s freedom to make financially unsound
deals.57 Given that even the first stage of the paternalistic argument
has not been established—other than by anecdote—it is like the
first consequentialist argument, more often settled by appeals to
other factors, such as those I will discuss below.
2. The Perfectionist Critique
The perfectionist argument endeavors to avoid making predic-
tions about the economic effects of litigation investment. Instead,
the argument takes the position that litigation investment must be
prohibited because it is inconsistent with certain deontological
principles, and that (to take but one variation of this argument)
Litigation Advances Within the Protection of Usury Laws, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 750,
751 (2012).
55. At various times litigation investment has been compared to usury, subprime lending,
and payday lending. See Richard L. Abel, How the Plaintiffs’ Bar Bars Plaintiffs, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 345, 366 (2007) (describing payday lending); Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation
Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 83, 83-85 (2008) (detailing subprime lending); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation
Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 637-38 (2007) (describing
usury). 
56. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, LETTER XII (1787), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
19-20 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
57. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 148-49 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1982) (1859).
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litigants should be prevented from debasing themselves by selling
their proceeds, or (to take another variation) society should not be
allowed to develop the view that legal rights are just another
commodity that can be bought and sold.58 As W. Bradley Wendel has
noted, the most promising line of argument that does not rely on
reference to the internal norms of law itself—which I will discuss
below under the rubric of the rule-of-law argument—depends on the
sort of anti-commodification arguments made by neo-Aristotelians
like Elizabeth Anderson and Michael Sandel.59
Perfectionism can take different forms. “Human nature” perfec-
tionism takes the development of human nature in its objective form
to be a moral requirement.60 It follows from this position that it is
both right and good for the state to prevent individuals from acting
in ways that are broadly speaking, irrational or, more narrowly,
contradict their ideal rational selves. A problem with human nature
perfectionism is that without a robust theory of human reason, it
seems not only somewhat arbitrary (why should human nature
matter so much?) but also question-begging (how can we distinguish
right reason from mere appetite?).61 
In the alternative, perfectionism can focus on a specified list of
objective goods with the perfection of human nature being instru-
mental to their achievement.62 “Objective goods” perfectionism finds
widespread support when there is near universal consensus on the
attractiveness of certain goods, such as art or health, and the patent
irrationality of other goods, such as self-debasement or pain.63
Outside a small set of clear cases, objective goods perfectionism
trades a bit on a form of consequentialism. If people seem to prefer
their own pleasure over items that others deem objectively good,
why should the state prefer the latter over the former? Critics of
58. See W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification
Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 656-57 (2014).
59. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 195-216 (1993);
MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012); see also
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 784
(1994) (“Different kinds of valuation cannot without significant loss be reduced to a single
‘superconcept,’ like happiness, utility, or pleasure.”).
60. See THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 9-10 (1993).
61. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 160-61 (1984).
62. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 325 (1971).
63. See PARFIT, supra note 61, at 161-62; RAWLS, supra note 62, at 325.
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perfectionism suspect that subjective tastes, which are just expres-
sions of revulsion or disgust, do the work of sorting out which
objective goods have priority over others.64 The objective goods
perfectionist response is that it is a category error to think that
there is a simple priority or “master value” under which all human
goods fall, and that Bentham was wrong to claim that pushpin is as
valuable as poetry.65 
Michael Walzer developed and supported his theory of “complex
equality” on the various “blocked exchanges” he observed around
him.66 For example, he noted that almost all modern societies either
prevented or would not honor contracts to purchase public office,
public honors, children, et cetera.67 Walzer makes a strong case that
as a formal matter, there are incommensurable goods, and that for
this reason, the state is justified in preventing people from using
money to distribute those goods.68 He does not provide much of a
test for determining which goods, as he puts it, are the ones that
“money can buy”; he relies to a certain degree on moral anthropol-
ogy.69
Michael Sandel, who builds on Walzer’s argument, embraces the
moral anthropology implicit in his version of perfectionism.70 He,
too, makes his argument by pointing out the many instances when
society feels uncomfortable allowing the market to govern the
distribution of goods.71 His general point, while the same as Wal-
zer’s main point, is built less by irrefutable example and more by
accretion. Whereas Walzer held up certain goods that clearly should
stay outside the market, Sandel’s goods are designed to induce some
ambivalence. For example, is it really self-evident that people
should not be allowed to purchase short-cuts through immigration
64. See Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1145-46 (1989).
65. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF REWARD (1825), reprinted in THE CLASSICAL
UTILITARIANS: BENTHAM AND MILL 94, 94 (John Troyer ed., 2003); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES
OF JUSTICE 8 (1983).
66. WALZER, supra note 65, at 95-103.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 103.
70. See Jeremy Waldron, Where Money & Markets Don’t Belong, 59 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 65,
65-66 (2012).
71. Id.
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and customs lines in the airport or better access to health care
through “concierge doctors”?72 Sandel’s argument is not that any one
of these market incursions into a previously nonmarket sphere of
activity is wrong in itself, but rather that the accumulation of
market incursions can destroy the vocabulary of nonmonetary value
theory, which perfectionism both identifies and endorses.73 Sandel
argues that “markets change the character of the goods and social
practices they govern.”74 Sandel’s “crowding-out” argument provides
an answer to the Millian who sees no basis in the “Harm Principle”
for preventing activities which are apparently wholly self-regarding.
Sandel argues that wholly self-regarding acts do not exist because
our shared noneconomic value system is a public good, which if
available to be enjoyed by one, is by necessity enjoyed by all, and
vice-versa: its rejection even by a few of us limits its availability to
everyone else.75 Of course, it is incumbent on the advocate of
perfectionism at the social level, like Sandel, to explain why certain
private acts may be prevented in the name of the preservation of
shared social attitudes, but others are not.
The perfectionist critique of litigation investment must be based
on the claim that litigation is a sphere of activity in which commodi-
fication is especially dangerous. It would resemble in form, there-
fore, the claim that a market in judicial outcomes is wrong.76 But
the reason we intuitively understand the commodification of judging
to be a synonym for “corruption” is not only because money is
exchanged in its doing—that is too simplistic a test—but because in
addition to money changing hands, we see that there is something
amiss with a judge making a decision for a citizen that paid the
most money. In other words, it is more like Walzer’s argument
about separate spheres with their own metrics of value than
Sandel’s argument that allowing markets in this one area might be
the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Legal judgment is about the
meaning of law and the weight of the facts. The amount of money
72. SANDEL, supra note 59, at 3, 19.
73. Id. at 93-130 (discussing how markets crowd out morals).
74. Id. at 120.
75. Id. at 120-21, 23.
76. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1997) (explaining how judicial corruption presents problems for
the “convicted payor,” “acquitted payor,” and “convicted non-payor”).
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offered by a party to the legal dispute is simply irrelevant to the
question the judge is supposed to answer. Stated that way, the
answer as to why an auction of judicial authority is unacceptable is
relatively easy to state: a judicial judgment is supposed to be based
on legal reasons and nothing else. To add a new reason—especially
a supervening reason—based on financial self-interest, friendship,
or loyalty to family is to make a mistake about the kind of reasons
that should count in civil litigation.77
3. The Rule-of-Law Critique
By analogizing the perfectionist critique of litigation investment
to the argument against selling judicial authority, we can see that
a promising avenue of argument is that litigation investment
introduces the wrong sort of reasons into the legal system. As a
result, the parties’ outcomes diverge from what the law should
ideally produce. This is different from the perfectionist arguments
put forward by Sandel and Walzer. It is an argument that law is a
special kind of reasoning which litigation investment will disrupt.
This Article calls this the “rule-of-law” argument against litigation
investment. The idea that legal reasoning is different in kind from
other forms of reasoning is not in itself radical.78 The rule-of-law
critique takes a further step to say that participants in litigation
must be shielded from nonlawyer influence when there is litigation
investment. According to the rule-of-law critique, clients must be
shielded from nonlawyer influence in the formation of legal advice
even if they want it and, by extension, the court must be protected
from the effects that flow from the nonlawyer’s influence on the
client.
77. The argument that judicial judgments should be based solely on legal reasons is
equally forceful in arguments against judges basing their decisions on their political
preferences or personal moral beliefs. For a version of this argument applied persuasively to
support limitations on arbitration waivers in discrimination cases, see David Horton,
Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L.
REV. 723, 745-65 (2012) (drawing on inalienability theory to “recalibrate the vindication of
rights doctrine”).
78. This is a version of the “core values” position in legal ethics. See Bruce A. Green, The
Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development,
and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1145-48 (2000)
(describing the six premises upon which the “core values rationale” relies).
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The rule-of-law critique is different from any of the perfectionist
arguments because although it is normative, it does not have to be
rooted in the controversial metaethical naturalism that perfection-
ism (arguably) must assume.79 One can make an argument about
what “our” legal system requires and remain neutral not only on the
question of what is good for all people, but even on the question of
whether legality must be the same for all people. Rule-of-law argu-
ments can be based on the kind of familiar scholarship produced by
Blackstone and Holmes when they wrote about the common
law—they claimed to be doing nothing more than describing the
essential features of our legal system, conceding, at least implicitly,
that at the most fundamental level these features were ultimately
contingent.80
The basic structure of the rule-of-law argument is this: (1) the
common law is characterized by features a, b, c, d ... z; (2) litigation
investment tends to weaken one of those features (for example, b);
(3) if a litigation investment transaction would weaken b, public
policy requires that courts refuse to recognize the transaction.
Barring that, legislatures should prohibit litigation investment
transactions that would result in the loss of b, either through
voluntary agreement or by operation of law. This Article suggests
that for critics of litigation investment, transfer of control is like
example b—an essential feature of litigation whose loss would
change the very character of the practice.81 As we will see, there are
subsidiary rule-of-law arguments against litigation investment,
such as the need for transparency before the court, or the rule of
standing that requires the real party in interest to be before the
court. These will be dealt with as elaborations on the original
argument—that party control is an essential feature of the rule of
law in common law adjudication.
79. See generally Richard Rowland, Moral Error Theory and the Argument from Epistemic
Reasons, 7 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1 (2013) (discussing arguments against metaethical
naturalism).
80. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 45; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW (1881).
81. JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING
THE SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN LITIGATION
1 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/8KFQ-994M (discussing how litigation investment
“undercuts plaintiff and lawyer control over litigation”).
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II. THE RULE-OF-LAW CRITIQUE OF LITIGATION INVESTMENT
If taken at face value, the rule-of-law critique is a claim about the
essential elements of common law adjudication.82 According to those
who embrace it, litigation investment “threatens to compromise the
integrity of the U.S. judicial system.”83 How exactly does litigation
investment undermine the integrity of the judicial system? There
are three subsidiary arguments that compose the party control
argument. These are: (1) interference with the lawyer-client rela-
tionship; (2) interference with the plaintiff-defendant relationship;
and (3) interference with the party-court relationship. Critics of
litigation investment have claimed that the control granted to third
parties in litigation investment either destroys or impermissibly
complicates these relations, and that the cumulative effect of the
episodes of interference that occur as a result distorts the legal
system to the point where it no longer serves its fundamental rule-
of-law function.84 The purpose of this Part is to demonstrate that in
each of these relations the common law has already permitted
parties to alienate their control by contract. This Part will briefly
explain why uncovering this contradiction matters. It matters
because each of the following subsidiary rule-of-law arguments
assumes that party control is necessary for the success of some
aspect of tort or insurance law. This set of assumptions is false.
A. Interference with the Lawyer-Client Relationship
The chief concern by those who raise rule-of-law objections to
litigation investment is that it will interfere with the relationship
between the party who has the claim and her lawyer. The Institute
for Legal Reform has argued that litigation investment “undercuts
plaintiff and lawyer control over litigation because the [litigation
investment] company, as an investor in the plaintiff ’s lawsuit,
82. Rule-of-law arguments are, therefore, similar to what Fuller called “the internal
morality of law.” See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 153 (2d ed. 1969).
83. Letter from U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20
(Feb. 15, 2011), in Comments: Alternative Litigation Financing Working Group Issues Paper,
A.B.A., at 136, 139, available at http://perma.cc/5C7V-K56T.
84. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 5, at 2949-52.
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presumably will seek to protect its investment, and can therefore be
expected to try to exert control over the plaintiff’s and counsel’s stra-
tegic decisions.”85 This concern is echoed by those who worry about
whether an attorney can fulfill her ethical obligations in a case in
which her client has signed a litigation investment contract.86
There are two very different arguments being made here. The
first is that litigation investment contracts may require lawyers to
violate ethical obligations to their clients. The second is that even
if a lawyer can ethically represent a client who has contractual
obligations to a litigation investor, the relationship between the
lawyer and the client will be affected in a way that somehow inter-
feres with the operation of the common law.87 The first argument
has been discussed most recently in a report published by the Amer-
ican Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 and an opinion of
the New York City Bar Association.88 Both report that an attorney
is not necessarily prohibited by the rules of professional responsibil-
ity from representing a client who wishes to make a contract with
a litigation investment firm.89 The second argument has received
less attention.
As will be demonstrated in Part III of this Article, the common
law permits parties to alienate control over litigation of their claims
85. BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 81, at 2.
86. See, e.g., Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm’n, Op. 191 (2006),
available at http://perma.cc/VGA2-MCFH (“[T]he lawyer must guard against any risk that the
financing company will attempt to control the litigation or otherwise interfere with the
lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment.”); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l &
Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-321 (2000), available at 2000 WL 33716933 (concluding litigation
investments contracts create an impermissible conflict of interest for the lawyer); see also
McLaughlin, supra note 55, at 651 (“[Litigation investment contracts] threaten to undermine
the duty of loyalty owed to a client by creating a contractual relationship with a third party.”).
87. On this second argument, see, for example, BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 81, at 15:
In order for American businesses to thrive, we need a reliable, predictable
judicial system whose judgments all of us—plaintiffs, defendants, consumers,
businesses—trust as impartial. [Third-party litigation financing] is antithetical
to the free enterprise system because it allows private parties to subject
businesses involuntarily to the coercive effects of our litigation system, all for
the purpose of profit.
88. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES (Dec. 27, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/W6UL-F2YB; Ass’n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, supra note 1.
89. See Anthony J. Sebok, Litigation Investment and Legal Ethics: What are the Real
Issues?, 55 CAN. BUS. L.J. 111, 123-26 (2014).
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to third parties in numerous contexts: assignment, subrogation, and
third-party liability contract. In the case of assignment, discussed
in Part III.B, the original claimholder and her attorney (if there had
been one) are fully substituted by another party with new represen-
tation; even if it is the same lawyer, the retainer is between the new
party and the lawyer. So the common law’s embrace of assignment
(which, while not complete, is quite advanced) says nothing pro or
con about the argument made against litigation investment with
regard to its interference with the lawyer-client relationship. In
subrogation and liability insurance, however, the relationship
between the party and her lawyer is identical to that of the claim-
holder and her lawyer in the litigation investment contract.90 Yet
courts have upheld contracts in cases of subrogation and liability
insurance, and rejected arguments that they are unenforceable
because the insurer’s control supplants the insured’s power over her
own case.
The concern that critics express about the relationship between
the claimholder and her attorney in litigation investment reflects a
similar confusion that insurance law scholars identified among
those who once argued against allowing lawyers to represent
insurers as well as insureds in the third-party liability insurance
context.91 The fear was that if a lawyer was permitted to jointly
represent both the insurer and the insured in litigation and the
insurer has the right to control under the insurance contract, the
lawyer cannot in advance obtain adequate consent from the insured
to prevent a conflict of interest if the insured and insurer come to
disagree on the conduct of the insured’s defense.92 The reason this
is not a real dilemma is twofold.
First, the insured can order the lawyer, as her agent, to accept
instructions from other persons, including the insurer, and in fact,
the insured may be obliged under the insurance contract to issue
such instructions.93 Second, if the insurer and the insured disagree
90. See infra Part III.C-D.
91. See Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Lawyers’ Ethics to Insurance
Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 28 (1997). 
92. Id. at 50.
93. Fischer, supra note 11, at 27 (“[T]he lawyer, in representing the policyholder, should,
as the policy holder’s designee accept direction from the insurer, for the claim’s defense to the
extent the insurer is responsible for the consequences, such as when the claim is likely to be
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with each other about the best way to litigate the claim and whether
the insured’s instructions to the lawyer to obey the insurer are still
in force, the lawyer’s obligation is clear: the lawyer must either
obtain a conflict waiver from both parties, or if that is impossible,
withdraw from representation of one or both parties.94 If the insured
comes to regret her promise to the insurer, her remedy is in
contract. She can always breach the contract and defend at her own
expense using any attorney she chooses.95 The insurer cannot use
the insurance contract to order the lawyer to be disloyal to the
insured. What the insurer can do (and this is perhaps what really
upsets the critics of dual representation) is make it very expensive
for the insured to regain the freedom to tell her attorney to do
things to which the insurer is opposed.96 The same is true in
litigation investment: the same duty of loyalty that exists between
the insured and her attorney exists between the claimholder and
her attorney. If the claimholder breaks with the investor for any
reason, her remedy is governed under the litigation investment
contract. Her relationship with her attorney cannot be “interfered
with” by the investor, even though the cost of regaining the freedom
to tell one’s attorney to do things to which the investor is opposed
may be very high.97 But that is an artifact of the terms of the
contract between the client and the investor—and the ability of the
investor to enforce the contract. It does not flow from the idea that
party control is an essential feature of the common law.
resolved within the policy’s limits.”).
94. See Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities:
Part I—Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599, 636 (2000) (“The proper understanding,
then, is that a carrier possesses the right to control the defense, that a disagreement with an
insured does not divest a carrier of this right, but that in a conflict situation a defense lawyer
cannot follow a carrier’s instructions without the informed consent of the insured.”).
95. Id. at 639-40.
96. See id. at 638-39.
97. The price will vary according to the terms of the contract and the background contract
doctrines that set the baseline duties and remedies between the claimholder and the funder.
See generally Sebok & Wendel, supra note 13.
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B. Interference with the Plaintiff-Defendant Relationship
Some critics have argued that litigation investment interferes
with the relationship between the claimholder and the party she is
suing. The Institute for Legal Reform has argued that
[t]he pernicious effect on defendants is clear: because [litigation
investment] agreements are typically made under a “veil of
secrecy,” a defendant facing a claim funded by [litigation
investment] may not even realize who is guiding litigation
strategy and decisions on the other side, making it unfairly
difficult to mount an adequate defense.98
In Weaver, Bennett & Bland v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., a plaintiff’s
lawyer alleged that an investor, Speedy Bucks, intentionally
induced the lawyer’s client to refuse a reasonable settlement offer,
against her attorney’s advice, and worse, did so in secret because
the lawyer did not know that the client had taken money from the
investor.99
As we will see in the discussion of the law of subrogation in Part
III.C, courts have enforced contracts that transfer party control in
litigation to insurers and have concluded that the question of who
is in control of the litigation may remain hidden from the factfinder
and the court, unless some independent wrong is alleged, such as
the promotion of perjury, the concealment of assets, or some form of
tortious interference. I will argue that the same rule-of-law concerns
are at stake in the transfer of party control in subrogation and
litigation investment, and the rule in the former should be the rule
in the latter.
In liability insurance, one of the risks that arises from transfer-
ring control is not, as is alleged in the case of litigation investment,
that settlement will not happen, but that settlement will happen too
easily and against the strong objections of the insured. The story of
how courts dealt with this risk by imposing the duty to settle on
98. BEISNER & RUBIN, supra note 81, at 14.
99. 162 F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.C. 2001); see McLaughlin, supra note 55, at 641 (stating
that in Weaver, “the litigation-funding companies secretly and wrongfully advanced $200,000”
to the client); see also Tiger Joyce, Shining a Light on the Lawsuit Loan Industry,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 2011, at 5, available at http://perma.cc/HGF3-J27L (citing
Weaver as an example of how litigation finance distorts litigation).
858 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:833
insurers and expanding the duty to defend is one of remarkable
responsiveness on the part of the law to the needs of society, but it
is important to remember that courts did not eliminate all the risks
faced by an insurance consumer who transfers party control in
exchange for coverage.100 This is the point of the discussion of the so-
called “full coverage” cases in Part III.D. The fact that in third-party
insurance the party who cedes control may have more faith in her
defense than her insurer has, and that in litigation investment the
party who cedes control may have more faith in her claim than her
investor has, is a distinction without a difference from a rule-of-law
point of view. In both cases, control over such things as whether to
go to trial is being sold for a price to a stranger, albeit for different
reasons.101 The underlying rationale for adopting a liberal attitude
in both cases—that the common law should allow such transactions
barring strong countervailing public policy reasons—is the same.
C. Interference with the Party-Court Relationship
Some critics have focused on the rule-of-law concern that
litigation investment interferes with the relationship between the
claimholder and the court. For example, in American Optical Co. v.
Curtiss, a party who, for its own reasons, did not want to enforce a
patent was approached by another party who wished to deprive the
patent infringer of its market, and who offered to take an assign-
ment of the patent and bring an infringement suit, which that party
100. See Leo P. Martinez, Classic Insurance Law in a Postmodern World, 2 NEV. L.J. 403,
410-14 (2002) (discussing the expansion of the duty to defend); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to
Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1990) (discussing the expansion of the duty to settle). These
pro-insured developments were clearly motivated by a number of factors, but it is important
to acknowledge the influence of the idea that insurance contracts should be interpreted
differently from other contracts. This was the legacy of Robert Keeton’s argument for
employing the doctrine of reasonable expectations in insurance contract interpretation. See
Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two
Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 823-26 (1990); Roger C. Henderson, The Formulation of the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside Insurance Law, 5
CONN. INS. L.J. 69, 73-74 (1998). See generally Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970).
101. But see Boardman, supra note 11, at 682-83 (explaining that the difference between
the insurer’s and a funder’s motivation to purchase control makes it impossible to draw useful
parallels between the two).
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would fund and control.102 The court held that the contract violated
New York’s public policy because it was a “contrivance” designed to
allow a stranger to profit by pretending to the court that it was the
real party in interest.103 Stephen Presser has argued that from the
earliest years, the “Blackstonian hostility to third parties becoming
involved in lawsuits,” had to do with the sense that “the third-party
funder is anonymous ... [using] secret influence” that “amounts to
‘fraudulent interference.’ ”104
The argument that the rule of law is violated because litigation
investment allows third parties to conceal their “real” interest from
the court warrants two different answers. First, as the discussion of
subrogation in Part III.C demonstrates, the common law has enforc-
ed contracts that are explicitly designed to conceal the true identity
of the party in interest from the jury (although probably not the
judge). Second, to the extent that this is a genuine concern, it is not
obvious that litigation investment requires opacity at all. Unlike
subrogation, in which the concealment of the identity of the
benefitted party is a major benefit—if not the central goal—of the
insurer, it is not clear that litigation investment funders need to
keep their involvement secret from adverse parties, the courts, or
even juries.105
III. LOSS OF PARTY CONTROL IN TORT AND INSURANCE LAW
Part II presented the rule-of-law critique of litigation investment
based on the centrality of party control. The central thesis of this
Article is that the idea that party control is central to the common
law is a myth. By knocking down this myth, I hope to show that
102. 56 F.R.D. 26, 27-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
103. Id. at 30.
104. Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical and
Ideological Perspective 9 (Sept. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
105. In Australia, for example, IMF, the leading litigation investment firm in that market,
advocates full, public, and mandatory disclosure of funding agreements. Kalajdzic et al., supra
note 33, at 123. It is an open question in the United States whether the existence and content
of funding agreements are discoverable and under what circumstances the agreements are
discoverable. See Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 721-24 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (expressing skepticism that “deal documents” are relevant under the Federal Rules of
Evidence). For an argument that mandatory disclosure of the existence of funding may benefit
plaintiffs and defendants, see Ronen Avraham & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Third-Party
Litigation Funding—A Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 235 (2014).
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there is no reason to fear that litigation investment will open the
door to litigation led by nonlawyers lacking any commitment to the
core values of the legal system. The following sections demonstrate
that the alienation of party control is a common feature of tort and
insurance law. The larger question that this Part will leave for the
Conclusion is what we can learn from the variety of ways in which
the courts have allowed control to be alienated, abandoned, and
contracted away. But before this larger question can be adequately
addressed, the degree to which control is much more fluid than the
critics of litigation investment seem to realize must be demon-
strated in detail.
A. Introduction: How to Lose Control
There are many ways that parties can transfer control in
litigation. The most familiar is assignment, by which a party
transfers the entire cause of action to a new party and, by extension,
full control as well as a legal right in whatever is gained in the
outcome, whether it is damages, property rights, or an injunction.106
Related to assignment is contractual subrogation. A contractual
subrogee is a stranger to a wrong who pays the victim for the
victim’s injury and then gains the right to receive repayment from
the defendant based on the victim’s rights, often by enforcing those
rights.107 However, as will be illustrated in greater detail below,
there are significant differences between assignment and subroga-
tion. Finally, a party can by simple contract agree to accept the
instructions of the promisor with regard to litigation involving the
promise.108 The sorts of promises that could be made are limited
only by the imagination of the contract drafters and the law. For
106. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (2014). Jeffrey O’Connell noted that there was no
logical reason why the doctrine of assignment did not include the possibility that a legal
claim—even a claim for a personal injury—could be transferred to a complete stranger, such
as a first-party insurer. See, e.g., Jeffrey O’Connell, Harnessing the Liability Lottery: Elective
First-Party No-Fault Insurance Financed by Third-Party Tort Claims, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q.
693; Jeffrey O’Connell, Transferring Injured Victims’ Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers: New
“Sole Remedy” Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 749, 775-93;
see also Jeffrey O’Connell & Craig Brown, A Canadian Proposal for No-Fault Benefits
Financed by Assignment of Tort Rights, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 434 (1983).
107. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 184 (2014).
108. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 1 (2014).
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example, one could imagine an asbestos producer desperate for
capital promising a bank that in exchange for a loan, the bank
would have the right to instruct the asbestos producer on every
detail of its mass tort litigation. Curiously, there seems to be very
little evidence that covenants concerning control of litigation are
explicitly built into commercial contracts ex ante.109 That is,
however, with one exception: almost every contract for liability
insurance demands from the insured that it cede control of litigation
in which it is a defendant to the insurer in exchange for a promise
of coverage.110
B. Assignment
1. The History of Limitations on the Assignment of Choses of
Action
An assignment is the act of transferring all or part of one’s
property, interest, or rights to another.111 The early common law
prohibited all assignments of choses of action, regardless of whether
they were based in contract, property, or tort.112 This prohibition
was relaxed until, as one court put it in 1947, “assignability of
things [in action] is now the rule; non-assignability, the exception;
and this exception is confined to wrongs done to the person, the
reputation, or the feelings of the injured party.”113
109. This is not to say that lenders never take control over the management of an
enterprise. Lenders can control decisions that affect ongoing or possible litigation, such as
when creditors take control during bankruptcy proceedings. The same might be said of
investors who receive special forms of equity that give them control over certain management
decisions. See Selvyn Seidel, Time to Pass the Baton, COM. DISP. RESOL. 47, 48 (Nov.-Dec.
2012).
110. Charles Silver has argued that liability insurance and litigation funding “evolved
independently but have similar structures and functions.” Charles Silver, Litigation Funding
Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 618-19; see also
Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen or Stone
Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2839 (2012) (comparing the control that liability insurers
currently exercise over their policyholder’s litigation with the control that critics of litigation
investment fear funders demand by contract); Steinitz, supra note 25, at 1333 (making the
same comparison as DeStefano, supra).
111. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 1 (2014).
112. See Webb v. Pillsbury, 144 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1943).
113. Id. (quoting 3 CAL. JUR. Assignments § 5 (1921)). In addition, most states will not
permit the assignment of breach of contract claims that are “purely personal in nature,” such
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Today, the original common law rule of non-assignability has been
almost fully abandoned.114 However, exceptions do persist. Someone
with a cause of action for a personal injury is barred in almost all
parts of the United States from assigning it to a stranger.115 This is
based on the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cum
persona (“a personal cause of action dies with the person”).116 The
original theory of actio personalis cannot be said to play much of a
role in the common law since the advent of survivorship statutes in
the nineteenth century; it goes without saying that tort claims now
survive the death of the plaintiff and can be maintained by a set of
persons named in the statute, usually members of the plaintiff ’s
family.117
Prior to the nineteenth century, common law courts embraced the
“doctrine of the non-assignability of choses in action” and prohibited
the assignment of any suit for damages in property, contract, or
as promises of marriage. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 52 (2010).
114. See, e.g., Osuna v. Albertson, 184 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345 (Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he tendency
of modern jurisprudence strongly favors the assignability and the survivability of things in
action.”); McKenna v. Oliver, 159 P.3d 697, 699 (Colo. App. 2006) (discussing how Colorado
law generally favors the assignability of claims, with the exception being causes of action for
invasion of privacy); Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 640 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa 2001)
(“[T]he law now generally favors the assignability of choses in action, and courts have
permitted the assignment of insurance policies under statutes providing for the assignment
of contracts in exchange for a money payment.”); Lemley v. Pizzica, 36 Pa. D. & C.2d 327, 330
(Ct. Com. Pl. 1964) (“The trend of judicial decisions as to the assignability of certain causes
of action is to enlarge, rather than to restrict the causes that may be assigned.”); Wis. Bankers
Ass’n v. Mut. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Wis., 291 N.W.2d 869, 876 (Wis. 1980) (discussing how the
principle of assignability exemplifies a trend of increasing commercial flexibility shared by
the courts and legislature).
115. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329,
330 (1987). Nine states allow the assignment of personal injury claims—Delaware, Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
Terrance Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and
Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 23 (2014).
116. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 385 (3d ed.
2012). Actio personalis worked in both directions—the death of the tortfeasor put an end to
the plaintiff’s suit also. Id. As Blackstone put it, “neither the [heirs of the deceased] plaintiff
have received, nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any
manner of wrong or injury.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *302.
117. In 1846 the English Parliament passed Lord Campbell’s Act, which created causes of
action for wrongful death and allowed designated representatives of the deceased plaintiff to
maintain the plaintiff’s causes of action for personal injury; that is, it abrogated actio
personalis. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.). The various states of the
United States soon followed. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 116, at 388; see, e.g., Nelson v.
Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Neb. 1989) (describing the operation of a state survival statute).
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tort.118 A chose in action was any “personal right[ ] ... which can only
be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical
possession.”119 These included, according to Holdsworth, “rights to
debts of all kinds, and rights of action on a contract or a right to
damages for its breach; rights arising by reason of the commission
of tort or other wrong; and rights to recover the ownership or
possession of property real or personal.”120
The doctrine of the non-assignability of choses in action must
have proven an increasingly difficult hurdle to overcome in commer-
cial litigation. Creative lawyers and courts used legal fictions to
soften its bite, such as using equity to circumvent the prohibition of
the assignment of contracts.121 As Holdsworth dryly noted, the
common law “was induced to connive at the introduction and
extension of ... evasion[s] of its principle that a chose in action is not
assignable.”122 Eventually the exceptions swallowed the rule, and
over the nineteenth century, the British Parliament legislatively
removed almost all limitations on the assignment of choses in action
for property and contract.123
After independence, the experience in the United States was
similar to that of England, except that the Americans were even
more eager than the British to allow the assignment of choses of
action in as many areas of law as possible.124 In Comegys v. Vasse,
118. EDMOND H. BODKIN, THE LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY 6-7 (1935).
119. Torkington v. Magee, [1902] 2 K.B. 427, 430 (Eng.).
120. W.S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common
Law, 33 HARV. L. REV. 997, 997-98 (1920).
121. Id. at 1021; see also Master v. Miller, [1791] 100 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1052 (K.B.) (Buller,
J.) (“Courts of Equity from the earliest times thought the doctrine too absurd for them to
adopt, and therefore they always acted in direct contradiction to it.”); Lee Aitken, “Litigation
Lending” After Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a License to “Bottomfeeders,” 28
SYDNEY L. REV. 171, 174-75 (2006) (reviewing the same history of nonassignability in courts
prior to the nineteenth century).
122. Holdsworth, supra note 120, at 1021-22.
123. Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 25(6) (Eng.) (removing limitations on
assignment of choses in contract); Real Property Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 106, § 6 (Eng.)
(removing limitations on assignment of choses for land). Note that special legislation was
passed as early as 1330 allowing executors and administrators to sue for trespass committed
to the personal property during the decedent’s lifetime. Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as
Intangible Property: An Exploration from an Assignee’s Perspective, 64 KY. L.J. 49, 52 (1975).
124. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816,
826-29 (1916) (describing American courts’ allowance of assignment of choses of action);
Radin, supra note 40, at 68 (observing that although Coke had argued that the same reasons
prohibiting champerty prohibited assignment, American courts were happy to distinguish the
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the U.S. Supreme Court regarded the doctrine of the non-assignabil-
ity of choses in action with skepticism and adopted a new theory of
assignments in bankruptcy that did not rely on the legal fictions
developed by the English courts.125 State courts followed suit. In
Rice v. Stone, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that
[the] ancient doctrine [against assignment] has been greatly
relaxed. Commercial paper was first made assignable to meet
the necessities of commerce and trade. Courts of equity also
interfered to protect assignments of various choses in action....
And at the present day claims for property and for torts done to
property are generally to be regarded as assignable.126
The Rice court noted “two principal reasons” for why assignments
of choses of action were completely prohibited in the early common
law.127 The first was that “[i]n early times [an assignment] was
regarded as an evil principally because it would enable the rich and
powerful to oppress the poor.”128 The second was that under common
law theory, an assignment is impossible “unless the assignor has
either actually or potentially the thing which he attempts to
assign.”129
2. Modern Permissiveness in the Law of Assignment
The first reason offered by the Rice court is the historical argu-
ment made by Blackstone and others against litigation invest-
ment.130 It is derived from the idea that, as Lord Abinger said in
Prosser v. Edmonds, “no encouragement should be given to litigation
by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights, which others
are not disposed to enforce.”131 The precise negative consequence to
society is less important than the fundamental point that uniquely
bad consequences flow from giving control over legal claims to
conditions in England from their own).
125. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 213 (1828); see Weinberg, supra note 123, at 61.
126. 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 566, 568 (1861).
127. Id. at 569.
128. Id.; see Holdsworth, supra note 120, at 1006.
129. Rice, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) at 569.
130. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *134-36.
131. [1835] 160 Eng. Rep. 196 (K.B.) 204 (emphasis added).
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strangers. The Supreme Court of Alabama only gestured towards
the dangers that free assignment of inheritance rights would
produce when it prohibited such an assignment in 1857:
Some of the recent cases do indeed relax the rules [of assign-
ment] ... but ... when fully considered, they do not go the length
of breaking down the barrier which the wisdom of ages has
erected against the perversion of the course of justice, by opening
a door for strangers to come in and interfere with suits in which
they have no interest.132
This may seem like an anachronistic rationale given the relatively
liberal attitude towards assignment in the modern common law
today, but it persists in various isolated doctrines. For example, as
noted above, New York prohibits the assignment of a “thing in
action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose
of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.”133 Maryland public
policy will not recognize assignments which are part of a “scheme[ ]
to promote litigation for the benefit of the promoter rather than for
the benefit of the litigant or the public.”134 The leading case
interpreting Maryland law on this point illustrates the pitfalls of
trying to limit assignment in modern times.135 In Accrued Financial
Services v. Prime Retail, Inc., a company with expertise in forensic
accounting took assignments of the legal claims of commercial
tenants in over fifty shopping malls and promised to remit to the
assignors between fifty and sixty percent of any discrepancies
discovered and paid to the company by the assignors’ landlords,
some of which were in Maryland.136 The Fourth Circuit held that
this practice violated Maryland public policy because it “improperly,
132. Poe v. Davis, 29 Ala. 676, 683 (1857) (emphasis added).
133. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (2014) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted the law to
prohibit the taking of an assignment in order to profit the legal costs of enforcing the cause
of action acquired, as opposed to profiting from enforcing the rights at issue in the suit. For
this reason, “New York courts have rarely encountered a case in which the challenged conduct
was found, as a matter of law, to constitute a violation of the statute.” Justinian Capital SPC
v. WestLB AG, N.Y. Branch, 952 N.Y.S.2d 725, 731 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (citing Bluebird Partners,
L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 731 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 2000)).
134. 298 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting 7 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:4 (4th ed.
2010)).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 294.
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and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encourag[ed]
others either to bring actions, or to make defenses which they have
no right to make.”137 Virginia, along with many other states, will not
recognize the assignment of legal malpractice claims.138 In its decis-
ion in MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, the Supreme Court of Virginia
justified this outcome on a consequentialist argument concerning
the “undue burden” such assignments would place on the legal pro-
fession and “the already overburdened judicial system.”139
The second reason offered by the Rice court, upon examination,
can be linked up to variations of the rule-of-law arguments. To take
but one example, when the Rice court referred to a “principle of law,
applicable to all assignments,” it based its argument not on a
prediction about the specific social consequences that might flow
from the assignment of choses in action for personal injury, but on
a claim about the status of inchoate claims in the common law, and
how courts should treat their purported assignment:
A claim to damages for a personal tort, before it is established by
agreement or adjudication, has no value that can be so esti-
mated as to form a proper consideration for a sale. Until it is
137. Id. at 299 (citations omitted). It is ambiguous whether the claims that are made
without “right” are fraudulent, frivolous and/or spurious, or defective simply because they are
the result of officious intermeddling by a stranger.
138. The states that prohibit assignment of legal malpractice claims include: Arizona,
Franko v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1353-54 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), abrogated on other
grounds by Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, P.A., 24 P.3d 593 (Ariz. 2001);
California, Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86 (Ct. App. 1976); Colorado,
Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492, 495 (Colo. App. 1993); Connecticut, Cont’l Cas. Co.
v. Pullman, 709 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D. Conn. 1989); Florida, KPMG Peat Marwick v. Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 36, 38 (Fla. 2000); Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc., 701 So. 2d
557, 559 (Fla. 1997); Illinois, Brocato v. Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass’n, 520 N.E.2d 1200,
1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); Indiana, Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 341-42 (Ind. 1991);
Kansas, Bank IV Wichita, Nat’l Ass’n v. Arn, 827 P.2d 758, 759 (Kan. 1992); Kentucky, Coffey
v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 756 S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Michigan, Joos v.
Drillock, 338 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Minnesota, Wagener v. McDonald, 509
N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Missouri, Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 581
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990); Nebraska, Earth Sci. Labs., Inc. v. Adkins & Wondra, P.C., 523
N.W.2d 254, 257 (Neb. 1994); Nevada, Chaffee v. Smith, 645 P.2d 966, 966 (Nev. 1982); New
Jersey, Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, P.C., 925 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 124
F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997); Tennessee, Can Do, Inc. v. Manier, 922 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1996);
Texas, Britton v. Seale, 81 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1996); and Virginia, MNC Credit Corp. v.
Sickels, 497 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Va. 1998).
139. MNC Credit Corp., 497 S.E.2d at 334 (quoting Goodley, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 87).
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thus established, it has no elements of property sufficient to
make it the subject of a grant or assignment.140
The court was relying on a distinction between wrongs to vested
interests, which included chattel, real property, and contractual
expectations, in contrast to violations of personal rights, which
included assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, and defamation.141 According to the court, the former
had an existence independent of the person who brought the claim
(and, presumably, whether the claim was brought at all), while the
latter did not exist until the party whose right had originally been
injured obtained a final judgment from a court.142 This skepticism
about the legal status of causes of action based on personal rights
persists in the Uniform Commercial Code, which at first held that
tort claims could not be treated as collateral under Article 9.143 Even
after significant revisions, the revised Article 9 recognizes security
interests in commercial torts but not torts “arising out of personal
injury to or the death of an individual.”144
Rule-of-law concerns can be seen in nineteenth-century doctrine,
which endeavored to distinguish between “naked” claims in fraud
(which could not be assigned) and fraud claims clothed in an
ownership interest (which could be assigned).145 In Gruber v. Baker,
140. Rice v. Stone, 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 569, 570 (1861) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 569-70.
142. Id. (“The considerations which are urged to a jury in [sic] behalf of one whose
reputation or domestic peace has been destroyed, whose feelings have been outraged, or who
has suffered bodily pain and danger, are of a nature so strictly personal, that an assignee
cannot urge them with any force.”). 
143. U.C.C. § 9-104(k) (1972).
144. Id. § 9-102(a)(13)(B)(ii) (2000).
145. See, e.g., Powe v. Payne, 94 So. 587, 588 (Ala. 1922) (“[I]t appears that complainants
are not entitled to immediate possession or enjoyment of any estate in the land and hence that
they are not in a position to file a bill for partition.”); Simmons v. Klemme, 291 S.W.2d 801,
802 (Ark. 1956) (“A mere naked right to set aside a contract on the ground of fraud is not
assignable.”); McCord v. Martin, 166 P. 1014, 1015 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917) (holding that the
cause of action was assignable because it was “much more than a mere naked right of action
for fraud and deceit”); Marshall v. Means, 12 Ga. 61, 67 (1852) (“Before such an interest can
be assigned ... the party assigning such right, must have some substantial possession ... and
not a mere naked right to maintain a suit.”); Mulready v. Pheeny, 148 N.E. 132, 133 (Mass.
1925) (“A mere naked right to set aside a contract on the ground of fraud is not assignable.”);
Cornell v. Upper Mich. Land Co., 155 N.W. 99, 102 (Minn. 1915) (affirming that “an
assignment of a bare right to [bring suit] ... for a fraud ... is void as against public policy,” but
holding the assignment at issue valid).
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the assignment in question was essentially identical to the assign-
ment in Accrued Financial Services.146 The assignee sued to take
possession of some mines whose title was held by a third party,
Baker.147 The assignee had received the assignment of the assignor’s
fraud claim against Baker, whom he believed—with evidence—had
taken title from him by deceit.148 It was proved that the assignee
promised to transfer the title held by Baker to the assignor if the
suit was successful; presumably the assignee would receive some
reward or pro rata share of the value of the mines, for her trouble.149
The court struck down the assignment, saying that “a bare right to
file a bill in equity for a fraud committed upon the assignor” cannot
be assigned.150 The court cited Prosser, in which Lord Abinger said,
“It is a rule, not of our law alone, but of that of all countries, that
the mere right of purchase shall not give a man a right to legal
remedies ... upon general principles, and by analogy ... a court of
equity will discourage the practice.”151 Even though it is tempting to
dismiss this case as an anachronism—a result of a formalist style
of reasoning that modern courts have abandoned—the argument
used by the court to nullify the assignments in Accrued Financial
was basically identical to the argument used by the court in Poe.152
Finally, rule-of-law concerns about treating inchoate rights as if
they were real can explain another limitation on assignment that
persists today—the distinction between the assignment of personal
injury claims and the assignment of the proceeds of personal injury
claims.153 Because personal injury claims were considered inchoate,
146. Gruber v. Baker, 23 P. 858 (Nev. 1890).
147. Id. at 858-59.
148. Id. at 859-60.
149. Id. at 863-64.
150. Id. at 862.
151. Id. at 862-63 (citations omitted).
152. This was Radin’s ultimate point. See Radin, supra note 40, at 70-78.
153. See Med. Lien Mgmt. Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 12CA0691, 2013 WL 2450632, at *4
(Colo. Ct. App. 2013) (reviewing jurisdictions that have allowed the assignment of the
proceeds of a personal injury claim even if the claim itself could not be assigned). Other courts
hold that there is no difference between the assignment of the action itself and the proceeds
which may be recovered in such an action, and thus that such an assignment violates the rule
prohibiting an assignment of a cause of action for personal injuries. See, e.g., Karp v. Speizer,
647 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (“[A]bsent a statute to the contrary a cause of action
for personal injuries is not assignable.”); Town & Country Bank of Springfield v. Country Mut.
Ins. Co., 459 N.E.2d 639, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Illinois law has established that a cause of
action for personal injuries may survive by virtue of the Survival Act, but it is nevertheless
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the proceeds of a personal injury had to be, by implication, inchoate
as well.154 But courts accepted the argument that proceeds of
personal injury claims could be the subject of an equitable assign-
ment (which is capable of enforcement once the proceeds come into
existence).155 So, although New York prohibited by statute the
assignment of any “claim or demand [when it is] to recover damages
for personal injury,” by this maneuver New York courts permitted
the assignment of the proceeds of personal injury claims, thus
allowing parties to “do by indirection what the common law and the
statute expressly [forbade].”156
Explicit rule-of-law arguments referencing control have been
employed to provide a rationalization in favor of the assignment of
the proceeds of personal injury claims, thus allowing courts to avoid
legal fictions like the equitable assignment. Some courts, such as
the Nevada Supreme Court in Achrem v. Expressway Plaza Limited
Partnership, observed that because the assignor keeps control over
the way a claim is litigated and settled when proceeds are assigned,
the assignment of proceeds does not violate common law
principles.157 This argument exploits the practical reality that title
over the proceeds of a claim has no special value to most assignors
as long as they have ownership of other funds of equal or at least of
negotiated value.158 The court basically said that once party control
is preserved, assignment in personal injury no longer violates the
rule-of-law requirements of the common law. Of course, the court
did not simply stipulate that party control in personal injury was a
good in itself. The court justified its focus on party control by
arguing that without it the legal system would be infected with
not assignable, on public policy grounds.”).
154. See, e.g., Costanzo v. Costanzo, 590 A.2d 268, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)
(“Any ‘specific thing,’ debt or chose in action may be the subject of an assignment. Obviously,
that which is not in existence or cannot be identified cannot be assigned.” (citation omitted)).
155. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 518 (1882) (“Story, in his Equity Jurisprudence, in
section 1040, says: ‘Courts of equity will support assignments, not only of choses in action, and
of contingent interests and expectancies, but also of things which have no present, actual or
potential existence, but rest in mere possibility.’”).
156. Grossman v. Schlosser, 244 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750-51 (App. Div. 1963).
157. 917 P.2d 447 (Nev. 1996); Grossman, N.Y.S. 2d at 448.
158. Achrem, 917 P.2d at 449 (“When the proceeds of a settlement are assigned, the injured
party retains control of their lawsuit and the assignee cannot pursue the action independently
... [because the assignors] retained control of their lawsuit.”).
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champerty.159 But this argument still begged the question of why
champerty was inconsistent with the rule of law.
C. Subrogation
“Subrogation is broadly defined as the substitution of one person
in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim or right.”160
Subrogation is a doctrine that “originated in equity to give relief to
a person or entity that pays a legal obligation that should have, in
good conscience, been satisfied by another.”161 Subrogation puts one
to whom a particular right does not legally belong in the position of
the legal owner of that right for the purpose of enforcing that right
for their own benefit. The right of subrogation is purely derivative,
because it permits a party to step into the shoes of the victim as it
pursues recovery from the responsible wrongdoer.162
Subrogation may be conventional (arising from contract) or
equitable (arising as a matter of law).163 Most cases of equitable
subrogation occur when a party pays a debt or an obligation of
another in order to protect her own secondary rights, to fulfill a
contractual obligation, or to comply with the request of the original
debtor.164 In order to enforce a right in equitable subrogation the
subrogee does not necessarily have to communicate with the subro-
gor or have the opportunity to control any claim the subrogor is
pursuing or could pursue. For example, when a master has been
held liable for an injury caused by her servant under respondeat
superior, the master is subrogated to the plaintiff’s claim against the
servant through operation of law, and yet the legal grounds of the
claim cannot be altered by anything the master now does.165
159. Id. at 448-49; see also In re Duty, 78 B.R. 111, 114 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1987); Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 655, 657 (N.C. 1995).
160. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 1 (2012).
161. Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Iowa 2004).
162. Id.
163. See Gregory R. Veal, Subrogation: The Duties and Obligations of the Insured and
Rights of the Insurer Revisited, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 69, 70 (1992).
164. See, e.g., Shpritz v. District of Columbia, 393 A.2d 68, 69 (D.C. 1978) (holding that
shareholders who paid a corporation’s tax debt became subrogated to the federal government’s
rights against customers of the corporation against whom it had tax liens).
165. Losito v. Kruse, 24 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ohio 1940).
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There is, however, a subset of subrogation rights that involve
either the actual control or potential control of the subrogor’s tort
claims by the subrogee. These are subrogation rights that arise
through first-party insurance contracts.166 As in all other forms of
subrogation, “an insurer who has paid a loss to an insured [becomes]
‘subrogated in a corresponding amount to the insured’s right of ac-
tion against any other person responsible for the loss.’ ”167 Insurers
or other providers of assistance and medical care to the victim may
recover from the person responsible for the loss only to the extent
that their contracts subrogate them to the victim’s rights.168 This is
conventional subrogation.169 Conventional subrogation assumes that
a valid claim can be asserted against the tortfeasor by the subrogor
at least equal to the amount paid by the subrogee/insurer. The key
point for our purposes is who controls that claim.170 This is a ques-
tion which should, in theory, be handled by the insurance contract.171
Questions of control arise because the tort victim’s rights are the
vehicle by which the insurer will get paid by the tortfeasor. In a
loose sense, subrogation can be achieved by assignment, and
certainly insurance contracts and courts sometimes treat assign-
ment and subrogation as if they were interchangeable.172 This is
partly a result of the fact that many insurance contracts require the
insured to assign their claim to the insurer as a means of subrogat-
ing the claim. But that does not mean that they are the same
thing.173 The differences between assignment and subrogation, while
166. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Subrogation § 31 (2014). First-party insurance subrogation rights
usually arise by contract, but even when the insurance contract does not explicitly provide for
them, the insurer’s right to subrogation attaches by operation of law upon payment of the loss
based on principles of equity. Id.
167. Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Iowa 2004) (quoting 6A JOHN
ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4051, at 103 (rev. ed.
1972)).
168. 4 NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 42.01 (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed.
2014).
169. 5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 49.02 (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed.,
2014).
170. Id. § 49.08 (discussing how to enforce subrogation rights).
171. Thomas S. Brown & M. Jane Goode, Conflict of Interest in Subrogation Actions, 22
TORT & INS. L.J. 16, 26 (1986).
172. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hensgen, 258 N.E.2d 237, 242 (Ohio 1970). 
173. 6A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4053
(rev. ed. 1972) (“[T]here is a difference between a subrogation and an assignment.”).
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rarely important in practice, reveal some interesting fault lines in
the common law’s view of the alienability of control.
Historically, insurance companies argued that there had to be a
difference because the prohibition of the assignment of causes of
action—which at one time extended to far more claims than
today—would have made subrogation impossible if it were viewed
as the same thing as assignment.174 As late as 1975, the subrogation
of insurance payments for medical expenses was challenged on the
grounds that personal injury claims cannot be assigned.175 Given the
economic importance of first-party personal injury insurance
(including automobile insurance, which rapidly became compulsory
in most states), it is not surprising that courts found ways to
distinguish assignment and subrogation when it was necessary to
preserve insurers’ subrogation rights.176
In Imel v. Travelers Indemnity Co., the insured demanded that
his insurer pay his medical expenses after a car accident but refused
to sign documents ratifying the insurer’s subrogation rights in
exchange for the funds.177 The insured’s argument came down to
this: the subrogation right sought by the insurer was an assignment
of his cause of action for personal injury because it gave the insurer
ownership of the claim, and that was not permissible under Indiana
law (ironically, the insured cited Rice v. Stone, discussed above, to
support his argument).178 The court rejected the insured’s argument,
noting that despite a body of precedent favoring the insured, the
court preferred a more modern approach supported by consider-
ations of public policy.179 The court noted the differences between
assignment and subrogation:
We agree with the majority of the jurisdictions which make a
distinction between an assignment of a claim for personal
174. Over v. Lake Erie & W. R.R., 63 F. 34, 35 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894); see, e.g., Brendan S.
Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort Subrogation,
40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 69-70 (2008).
175. See Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 270, 271 (S.D. 1975).
176. For a typical discussion by a court of the public policy concerns that justify drawing
the distinction, see Hosp. Serv. Corp. of R.I. v. Pa. Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 110 (R.I. 1967) (“All
of us are aware that today Blue Cross serves a most important beneficial, social, and economic
purpose in our state.”).
177. 281 N.E.2d 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
178. Id. at 920.
179. Id. at 921.
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injuries and subrogation of one’s rights arising from a personal
injury. A few of the distinctions are: subrogation secures
contribution and indemnity, whereas assignment transfers the
entire claim; the consideration in subrogation moves from
subrogor to subrogee, whereas in an assignment the consider-
ation flows from assignee to assignor; assignment contemplates
the assignee being a volunteer, whereas subrogation rests on a
contractual duty to pay; assignment normally covers but a single
claim, whereas subrogation may include a number of claims over
a specific period of time; subrogation entails a substitution,
whereas assignment is an outright transfer.180
The Imel court probably suspected that the insured’s invocation
of the prohibition of the assignment of personal injury claims was
purely pretextual—the insured wanted to take the payments made
by the insurer, keep them, and then sue the tortfeasor for the cost
of the medical payments and keep these costs too.181 The question of
the insured’s control over his lawsuit was probably never at issue in
Imel; like many personal injury cases, the insurance payment was
only for a portion of the damages suffered, and the insured had
sufficient incentive to pursue his claim with his own lawyer. The
insurer wanted the fruits of the insured’s efforts and was more than
happy to let the insured control the suit. That is the significance of
the last item in the list quoted above: “subrogation entails a
substitution, whereas assignment is an outright transfer.”182 This
meant that unless required by the court, the insurance company
was not a party to the insured’s suit, which meant that the insurer
could not control the suit as a party (even if it wanted to).183 From
180. Id.
181. See 46A C.J.S. INSURANCE § 1993 (2014) (“Subrogation prevents ... unjust enrichment
to the insured that would result from double recovery.”); 16 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 222:8 (3d.
2014) (“[I]t has been stated that subrogation has the objective of preventing the insured from
recovering twice for one harm, as would be the case if he or she could recover from both the
insurer and from a third person who caused the harm.”); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INSURANCE LAW § 3.10(7) (1988) (“Recognition and enforcement of a right of subrogation for
health insurers is primarily premised on precluding duplicative recoveries.”); see also
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 104 A.2d 288, 292 (N.J. 1954) (explaining that one
of subrogation’s goals is to protect against the possibility that the “insured would be unjustly
enriched by virtue of a recovery from both the insurer and the third party”).
182. Imel, 281 N.E.2d at 921.
183. See In re Garmhausen, 262 B.R. 217, 221-22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the
meaning of substitution in the context of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c)).
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the insurer’s perspective this was the point. It did not want to be a
party; it did not want to be in front of the jury.184 Whatever the
merits of this tactical consideration, it explains why insurers sought
to maintain the possibility of subrogation without assignment.
In most cases, the interests of the insurer and the insured are in
alignment against the tortfeasor, so it requires a little digging to see
why control is ever an issue.185 To be precise, what is at issue is not
the problem of the faithless insured, although the insurer must
worry about her too.186 Faithless insureds usually try to settle their
claim with the tortfeasor without telling the insurer; although they
can also include insureds who, after receiving payments from the
insurer, refuse to “cooperate” as the insurance contract requires,
which might mean anything from refusing to file a complaint to
refusing to participate in litigation initiated by the insurer in their
name. Many doctrines have developed to deal with the faithless
insured—ranging from holding the insured liable to the insurer for
destroying the claim under which the insurer was subrogated, to
allowing the insurer to sue the tortfeasor directly for the portion of
the insured’s claim under which the insurer was subrogated.187
Neither of these remedies really go to the problem of control in
subrogation because the insurer is not seeking to control how the
insured litigates her own case. In the former, the insurer is simply
184. “It is thought by insurers that a jury will be less sympathetic to a suit if it is brought
in the name of the insurer, so it will bring the suit in the name of the subrogor/insured.” NEW
APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 168, § 42.03; see, e.g., Celanese Corp. of
Am. v. John Clark Indus., Inc., 214 F.2d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1954) (suggesting that the
defendant’s reason for attempting to join the plaintiff ’s insurance companies was to inform
the jury that the plaintiff was insured and thereby potentially prejudice the plaintiff ’s case);
Acro Automation Sys. v. Iscont Shipping, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 413, 421 (D. Md. 1989) (“[The
defendants] would consider it a strategic advantage to have the jury know that a plaintiff has
another source of recovery other than from them.”); Stouffer Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 88
F.R.D. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (“[T]here is a substantial risk of prejudice to an insurer which
is forced to join as a plaintiff, as the presence of an insurer may affect a jury’s decision on the
merits.”); Kint v. Terrain King Corp., 79 F.R.D. 10, 12 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (citing prejudice
to the plaintiff as one factor supporting a decision denying a motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19 to join the plaintiff’s insurance companies).
185. Brown & Goode, supra note 171, at 26.
186. The faithless insured is someone who destroys her claim before receiving anything on
behalf of the insurer’s subrogated interest.
187. City of N.Y. Ins. Co. v. Tice, 152 P.2d 836, 842-43 (Kan. 1944). An insurer can sue the
tortfeasor directly only if the tortfeasor was on notice of the potential subrogation claim
destroyed by the insured’s release. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 669 (5th ed. 2012).
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pursuing contract damages, whereas in the latter, the insurer is, in
effect, taking an assignment.188 Control is not at the center of the
problem with the faithless insured, because her conflict with the
insurer is not over the control of a suit she wants to pursue, but
rather over her abandonment of the suit in toto.
The question of control arises, therefore, in cases of subrogation
when the insured and the insurer both agree that the insured
should make a claim. These cases can arise in one of two situations.
If an insurer paid all of the insured’s loss, both federal law and
many states say that the insurer is the real party in interest and
must bring the suit in its own name.189 But some states say
otherwise, as was illustrated above in Imel.190 When the insurer
wants to have the insured step forward as the plaintiff in the case
and yet control it like a puppet, the defendant might attempt to
expose this fact in the hope that it will turn the jury against the
plaintiff. Most courts have rejected moves by defendants to expose
the insurer as the puppeteer pulling the strings in the case. As the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma said:
Defendant has the statutory right to have a cause of action
prosecuted against him by the real party in interest .... The
concern of the defendant ends, however, when a judgment for or
against the nominal plaintiff would protect him from any action
on the same demand by another, and when, as against the
nominal plaintiff he may assert all defenses and counterclaims
available to him the same as if the claim were enforced by the
real owner .... The insured and insurer are free to enter into
additional agreements or to set up a trust agreement in order to
best handle the collection of the loss. The parties’ fundamental
right of liberty to contract, when done in a lawful manner in the
absence of fraud is not to be dictated by the effect it might
possibly have on defendant. This is a matter of business judg-
ment to be determined by insured and insurer.191
188. The latter option—the insurer seeking its subrogation without the cooperation of the
insured—is possible in theory, but is highly impracticable unless the claim can be resolved
entirely on the pleadings, as was the case in City of New York Insurance Co. v. Tice. 152 P.2d
836.
189. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1949) (citing 3 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1339 (2d ed.)).
190. Imel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 281 N.E.2d 919, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
191. C & C Tile Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 P.2d. 554, 561 (Okla. 1972) (citations omitted).
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The court observed that the plaintiff clearly wished “to prevent
disclosure of plaintiff’s insurance to the jury.”192 Given that the
plaintiff had nothing to gain in the litigation, it is clear that the
plaintiff’s insurer in coordination with counsel that it was supplying
was controlling the litigation.193 In Garcia v. Hall, the Tenth Circuit
took the same position.194 In that case, the insured admitted that he
had no interest in the outcome of the suit and was bringing it only
for the benefit of the insurer—who did not want to be a party.195
If an insurer’s payment only partially compensated the policy-
holder, such as when the policyholder sustained losses in excess of
policy limits or when there was a deductible that the insured, in
theory, could personally recover, the insurer could seek to hide
behind the insured’s residual interest, no matter how slight, so the
insurer would not have to declare itself as a party to the suit against
the tortfeasor.196 Wise to this maneuver, tortfeasors have sought to
have the insurer’s interest revealed, especially when it is substan-
tial in comparison with that of its insured.197 The federal courts
have given their blessing to arrangements by which creative
insurers conceal their interest in suits where they are the only party
interested in suing the tortfeasor. In Virginia Electric & Power Co.
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the plaintiff suffered $2,200,000 in
damages due to the failure of a power generating station.198 All but
$150,000 of the loss had been reimbursed by its insurer.199 The
192. Id. at 560 (pointing out that it would be inconsistent for the court to allow the jury to
learn of the insurer’s interest in the suit if juries are prohibited from knowing whether the
defendant has liability insurance); see NEW APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra
note 168, § 42.03 (noting that it would be unfair if the “plaintiff-insurer must disclose its name
under the ‘real party in interest’ doctrine, but the defendant-insurer does not”).
193. The practice of a subrogor being the party plaintiff in a case in which they had no
interest and no control has been around for a while. See, e.g., Albert W. Jenner, Jr. & Phillip
W. Tone, Pleading, Parties and Trial Practice, 50 NW. U. L. REV. 612, 612 (1955) (“An insured
under an automobile collision policy who has collected for property damage under the policy
ordinarily has no control over a subrogation action brought subsequently in his name by the
insurer under the subrogation provision of the policy.”).
194. 624 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1980).
195. Id.
196. See, e.g., Trogub v. Robinson, 853 N.E.2d 59, 63, 65-67 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
197. See June F. Entman, More Reasons for Abolishing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
17(a): The Problem of the Proper Plaintiff and Insurance Subrogation, 68 N.C. L. REV. 893,
895-97, 911-31 (1990).
198. 485 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1973).
199. Id. at 82.
2015] SHOULD THE LAW PRESERVE PARTY CONTROL? 877
insured and insurer agreed that the insured would file suit for the
entire $2,200,000 loss and that the insurer “would furnish counsel
and have exclusive direction and control” of the claim.200 The
agreement further specified that if successful, the insured would
receive its $150,000 uninsured loss and it would not be obligated for
the costs and expenses of the suit.201 The court concluded that the
tortfeasor could not force the insurer to join the suit; it noted that
the fact that the insurer was in control of the suit counted in favor
of allowing it to remain unnamed.202
Although the insured’s incentive to bring a claim that will benefit
the insurer will vary based on many factors (including how much,
if anything, she might keep after her lawsuit is resolved), the in-
surer’s incentive remains the same (recovery of the payment from
the tortfeasor); the only thing that varies is the cost to it of the
insured’s suit.203 The cost might be close to zero if the insured is
highly incentivized to sue and retains a contingency fee attorney
who will advance all costs; or the cost might be high if the insured
has no remaining financial interest in the claim and participates
grudgingly.204 There will be a separate but non-negligible cost to the
insurer of monitoring the suit. There is also an additional cost of
achieving an outcome which meets the insurer’s needs if there is a
difference of opinion between the insured and the insurer as to
settlement.205
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to note that the
common law permits the insured ex ante to give up as much or as
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 85-86 (holding that one equitable factor against forcing joinder was that
“because of [the insurer’s] control of the suit, it will be bound by any judgment in favor of the
defendants”).
203. Maher & Pathak, supra note 174, at 86-87 (“The lower a plaintiff ’s [that is, the
insured’s] expected recovery, the less likely s/he is to expend effort prosecuting a suit .... The
[insured] ... is the junior creditor on the dollars recovered: the first money in goes to the
insurer; the next dollars go towards paying the plaintiff ’s attorneys and costs of suit; and any
remaining dollars go to the plaintiff.”).
204. Id. at 87-88.
205. Brown & Goode, supra note 171, at 26 (“In the event the litigation is successful or
settlement offers are extended, the potential for conflict arises. While the parties are of a
single mind with respect to the fact of recovery, there may be an enormous difference of
opinions as to the allocation of the proceeds, fees, and costs, as well as who should have the
power to accept or reject an offer of settlement.”).
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little control over these questions as he sees fit before he knows the
details of the suit that it will be bringing against the tortfeasor.
Insurers have developed various mechanisms for taking control over
claims brought by subrogors without having to join the litigation or
take a complete assignment. The courts allow these strategies, as
long as the basic requirements of contract law are observed. One
federal court, when faced with a request to name an insurer as “a
party in interest” in a suit brought by an insured whose interest was
$1000 of a $228,127 claim, dismissed the defendant’s offer of proof
that the insurer was controlling the litigation as irrelevant: “That
argument is not persuasive. ‘As a practical matter, ... the insurance
company will control the prosecution no matter in whose name it is
brought.’ ”206
The mechanisms by which the insurer can control the litigation
may be informal (based on the past and future transactions of the
parties), or a threat of collateral litigation based on a breach of a
duty to cooperate, or post-accident contracts that the insurer asks
the insured to sign as a condition of receiving the payment under
the insurance contract.207 This last type of mechanism has various
names, such as “subrogation receipts,” “loan receipts,” and “trust
agreements.”208 Each instrument can be drafted to fit the needs of
the situation. The language in the agreement that was at issue in
C & C Tile Co. v. Independent School District is illustrative, and
perhaps typical:
THE UNDERSIGNED hereby acknowledge(s) receipt of
$84,764.00 from—INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA— ... and the undersigned hereby irrevocably ap-
point(s) said Insurance Company as agent and attorney-in-fact
of the undersigned with full power to collect, enforce, compro-
mise, release and dispose of such property, claims and recoveries
206. Prosperity Realty v. Haco-Canon, 724 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1546, at 656).
207. Veal, supra note 163, at 89.
208. Id. at 77 (“A loan receipt is a device with which the insurer essentially settles by
paying the insured and taking control of, but not title to, the insured’s claims.”); see also NEW
APPLEMAN LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 168, § 42.04 (2013) (providing examples
of all three).
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through attorneys and representatives of the said Insurance
Company’s own selection, by legal proceedings or otherwise.209
Under this instrument the insurer had full control of the insured’s
lawsuit. The insurer could select and instruct the attorneys. It was
paying the attorneys (unless the insurer found an attorney willing
to work for a contingent fee). It should be noted that the relation-
ship between the attorneys selected by the insurer and the insured
was the same triangular relationship that has been the subject of
heated disputes about attorneys hired by liability insurers in the
defense context.210 The same question arises: Is the attorney the
agent of both the insured and the insurer, or just the insured?211 In
the case of a conflict of opinion over litigation strategy and settle-
ment, what should the attorney do?212 In the liability insurance
context (discussed in Part III.D), there has been disagreement
among scholars and commentators about whether the insured can
be represented by the same lawyer whom the insurer uses to control
the litigation.213 But in the liability insurance context, the risk is
that an insurer acting in bad faith will instruct the attorney jointly
representing the insurer and insured to expose the insured to excess
liability. In the subrogation context, the risk goes entirely in the
other direction—that having been made whole by the insurer, the
insured will destroy the insurer’s opportunity to be made whole by
the tortfeasor.
The possibility that there may be a conflict between the insurer
and the insured over the conduct of litigation against the insured’s
209. 503 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1972) (emphasis added).
210. See, e.g., Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 269-70 (1995).
211. Id. at 273.
212. Id. at 266-67.
213. See Robert J. Johnson, Comment, In-House Counsel Employed by Insurance
Companies: A Difficult Dilemma Confronting the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 945, 962-65 (1996). The consensus seems be that it is ethical for attorneys
employed by subrogors to represent subrogees. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1370 (1976). The committee further stated that such a
representation was appropriate “provided you make the prescribed disclosure and remain
sensitive to any subsequent divergence of interests of your clients.” Id. All sides of this debate
agree that the question is not whether the lawyer employed by the insurer can be an agent
of the insurer and follow its instructions. Instead, the question is whether that person can
also be an agent of the insured. Id.
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tortfeasor is not large, but it exists. The insured’s interests are
protected to some extent by the “make-whole” rule, which says that
an insured must have all of its losses paid before the insurer can
take anything. This creates an incentive for the insurer, if it is
controlling the litigation, to pursue a resolution to the insured’s
claim that leaves the insured whole.214 But this only guarantees that
the insured’s interests are protected if there is a final judgment that
produces funds which, in combination with insurer’s payment to the
insured, are equal or greater than the insured’s loss. This may not
happen if, for example, the insurer—who controls the case—refuses
a settlement offer and chooses to go to trial on the insured’s claim,
and the tortfeasor prevails. The result could be that the insured, but
not the insurer, is worse off than if there had been a settlement
because the entire settlement may have gone to the insured. In
addition, if the make-whole rule does not control—either because
the jurisdiction does not accept the rule or because the insurance
policy imposes a “first-dollar” rule that ensures that the first dollar
of every settlement goes to the insurer—then the insured and the
insurer may come into conflict if the settlement does not provide for
the insured’s uninsured losses.215 The only difference is that now the
insurer wants settlement more than the insured. Under either
scenario, insurance law does not protect the insured: there is no
duty on the part of an insurer—as subrogee—to settle its subrogor’s
claim in good faith.216
If a disagreement over litigation strategy and settlement between
the insured and the insurer arises, the attorney’s obligations are
214. Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between Insured and Insurer in a
Subrogation Case, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 805-07 (1994). This is the majority rule. See NEW
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION, supra note 169, § 49.04 (“[A] minority of
jurisdictions adhere to the ‘insurer-whole’ rule, whereby the insurer is made whole first out
of a recovery from a third-party tortfeasor to the extent of the insurer’s payment to the
policyholder.”).
215. Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1263, 1294 (2011).
216. See, e.g., Lahti v. Finnish Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 256 N.W.2d 610, 611-12 (Mich. App.
1977) (“[W]e have searched in vain for any case holding an insurer liable to its insured for
refusing to compromise its subrogation rights and enter into a settlement and release
agreement with an alleged tortfeasor ... [and] in the absence of any such provision in the
subrogation agreement, we are of the opinion that no such duty existed in this case.”). This
is quite the opposite from the protection offered to the insured under the duty to settle in good
faith that has arisen in the parallel situation in liability insurance.
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defined by the rules of professional responsibility for her jurisdic-
tion—assuming the attorney represents both the insured and the
insurer. When the attorney has been told by the insurer to reject a
settlement offer that the insured thinks is reasonable, the attorney
clearly can no longer represent both parties and must either with-
draw completely or represent only one party.217 But that does not
really solve the insured’s problem, which is that she wants to
maintain control over the case. Through its new lawyer, the insurer
can still effectively control the insured’s litigation by refusing to ac-
cept settlement with the tortfeasor. The only way for the insured to
settle separately with the tortfeasor is for him to breach his
contractual obligations to the insurer, which would have significant
consequences arising from the violation of his duty to cooperate with
the insurer.218
The point of this discussion is not to conclusively answer the
question of how the insured can maintain control over its claim if it
is in conflict with the insurer over the handling of a subrogated
claim. The point is simply to demonstrate that the law of subroga-
tion does not privilege party control. Courts accept that control can
be alienated without requiring the claims to be assigned. Further,
courts do not directly limit alienation of control, but instead regu-
late the risks that may flow from alienation by providing a safety
net of common law doctrines to ensure that parties who alienate
control receive a minimum of their equitable interest in the claim,
for example, the make-whole rule, which protects the insured.
Some have made rule-of-law arguments against insurers using
subrogation contracts to hide their interest in a case from juries, but
they are based on a very different set of concerns than the rule-of-
law arguments for party control reviewed in this Part. June Entman
217. Brown & Goode, supra note 171, at 28.
218. It is an open question whether the insurer could ask a court to issue an injunction
against the insured sharing confidences and work product developed by attorneys who were
in the employ of the insurer on behalf of the insured with third parties. At the very least, the
insured would have to reimburse the insurer for all monies spent by the insurer to pursue the
insured’s claims not subrogated to the insured. It may also be liable for all or some portion of
the insurer’s subrogation interest if the insured’s conflict with the insurer prejudices the
insurer’s remaining claim against the tortfeasor. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Bernstein, 16
N.Y.S.2d 45, 47-49 (Mun. Ct. 1939) (holding that settlement for nonsubrogated portion of
insured’s claim could not insulate the insured from liability to insurer if the amount claimed
by the insured was proven by insurer to be in excess of the insured’s uncompensated injury).
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argues that subrogation receipts and permissive joinder rules
violate principles of federal and state common law.219 Her argument
has two parts. First, federal civil procedural values are violated
when courts permit insurers to participate in federal litigation with-
out revealing themselves as parties in interest, such as in Virginia
Electric & Power Co.220 Second, and related to the first, is that “one
in control of litigation ... should bear the responsibilities of party
status ... [i]f a subrogated insurer is in actual control of a lawsuit,
but not named as a party ... its citizenship is ignored.”221
Entman’s arguments may be persuasive, but they are based solely
in rule-of-law values that deal with ensuring that the courts and
adverse parties are not misled about who the real party in interest
is. Her arguments are not grounded in a concern over how the
contract between the insurer and the insured interferes with the
relationship between the insured and her lawyer, nor from a con-
cern over interference with substantive choices made in the course
of the litigation with the tortfeasor/defendant. All a critic like
Entman wants is candor, which is not trivial given the tactical
importance of establishing or destroying diversity jurisdiction in
federal jurisdiction, but her concerns are very different from those
of critics of litigation investment.
D. Full Coverage Cases in Liability Insurance
Usually, someone with an interest in the outcome of a lawsuit
would prefer that the current claimholder control the litigation, so
that instead of paying for control, the interested party “free-rides”
on the effort of the original claimholder. However, as we saw in the
previous section, when a subrogee has an equitable interest in the
legal claim, it may often make sense for them to secure control over
the conduct of litigation enforcing that claim through a contract. But
what if the party seeking control has only a contingent (non-
219. See June F. Entman, Compulsory Joinder of Compensating Insurers: Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 19 and the Role of Substantive Law, 45 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1994);
Entman, supra note 197, at 899, 932.
220. See Entman, supra note 197, at 947-48 (“Thus, in the Virginia Electric case, a
misapplication of rule 17(a) allowed the litigation in federal court of a two million dollar claim
between nondiverse parties on the basis of the citizenship of a merely nominal
representative.”).
221. Entman, supra note 219, at 66-68.
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equitable) interest in the outcome of a legal claim against a
stranger? As a practical matter, rights to control are rarely sought
outside of the contexts already reviewed—assignment and subroga-
tion. This may be for pragmatic reasons (the cost of obtaining the
rights and enforcing them are too high) or legal reasons (courts will
not enforce contracts seeking to enforce the right to control litigation
by non-parties). There is, however, one significant exception to this
generalization, and that is third-party liability insurance.
Before turning to liability insurance, I want to briefly review
other contexts in which courts and legal scholars have noted the
possibility of a party obtaining the right to control a stranger’s
defensive litigation. First, as Nathan Oman has observed, the
theoretical possibility is present in every contract.222 A widget
manufacturer, in order to win the confidence of a counterparty (for
example, lender or supplier) may make promises that limit her
liberty with regard to control over her property or business.223
Presumably, were it valuable to the counterparties, the covenants
could extend to limiting control over future legal claims against it
and litigation arising from those claims. One occasionally sees hints
of this sort of exchange in, for example, real estate lending and
construction finance.224 In corporate finance, scholars have estab-
lished that lenders secure control over the management of borrow-
ers through covenants in debt instruments, which can rival the
more naked power they exercise as creditors in bankruptcy.225 The
control, while significant, is limited to replacing personnel and
222. Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the
New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 138 (2005).
223. These covenants “would significantly limit his former freedom to control ‘business’
property.” Id.
224. “[Lender] had the right to approve leases, set rental rates, input management contract
decisions, control secondary financing ... and control the use of the Partnership’s Reserve
Account .... It is uncontroverted that these terms are standard loan terms in the industry.”
Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 776 F. Supp. 504, 511 (N.D. Cal. 1991). But see JOHN D. HASTIE,
ALI-ABA, REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION, DEVELOPMENT, AND DISPOSITION FROM THE DEVELOPER’S
PERSPECTIVE § 11.1.1 (2009) (observing that, although the construction lender attempts to
“exert some element of control over the prosecution of the project” through “extensive and
burdensome reporting requirements ... [t]he lender cannot exercise control of the project”).
225. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1226-28 (2006); Frederick Tung, Leverage in
the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 115, 135-38 (2009).
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controlling investment decisions. It has not extended to controlling
defensive litigation, or at least if it has, the covenants that would
grant that power have not been publicly revealed and discussed.226
It is an interesting question why more lenders have not demanded
control over litigation—either offensive or defensive—which might
be critical to the borrower’s long term interests and hence to the
lender’s long term interest in getting repaid.227 Lenders and courts
are not unfamiliar with the possibility nor do they lack a vocabulary
with which to deal with conflicts that arise when lenders attempt to
exercise control in their borrowers’ litigation.228 Given the absence
of the practice, it is impossible to tell whether its use is deterred by
fear that contract conditions demanding control over a borrower’s
litigation would not be enforced, or because there are more efficient
mechanisms for lenders to reduce the risk of default.229
The one context in which contracts are used to control future
defensive litigation by a counterparty is the third-party liability
insurance contract.230 As discussed in Part II, a liability insurance
contract is really two forms of insurance, which in theory could be
separated: the promise to pay liabilities that fall under the contract
and the promise to pay for legal expenses connected with the
defense of liability claims.231 In the United States, the two are
226. See, Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses
and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335, 340-43 (1991).
227. This question is based on a suggestion by Jonathon Molot. See Jonathan T. Molot, A
Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 403 (2009).
228. On a routine basis courts are asked to determine the boundary lines of control over
plaintiff debtors’ litigation by creditors in bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns.
Corp., 285 B.R. 848, 856 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[The creditor’s] rights to participate in an
adversary proceeding [brought by the debtor], like any other lawsuit, may be thought of as
falling along a continuum, with the right to file briefs and be heard in argument (rights
similar to those of amicus curiae) at one end, and with the ownership or control of the
underlying causes of action at the other.”); see also Seidel, supra note 109.
229. For a comprehensive review of the public policy limitations on contracts, see David A.
Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 563 (2012).
230. Standard general liability insurance contracts “are generally interpreted as granting
the company plenary and exclusive control of the defense.” Silver, supra note 11, at 1596
(“Ordinarily, the company can select counsel to defend the insured, discharge appointed
counsel and name a replacement without the insured’s consent, bargain with appointed
counsel over fees, monitor counsel and direct litigation strategy, require counsel to inform the
company of settlement demands and procedural developments, direct counsel to initiate
settlement discussions, settle claims without an insured’s consent and decline to settle claims
over an insured’s objection, and file appeals.” (footnotes omitted)).
231. See Boardman, supra note 11, at 682-83.
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always sold together, but for the purposes of this Article, it is worth
separating the two forms of insurance into judgment costs insurance
 (JCI) and litigation costs insurance (LCI).232 They are sold together
because the insurance contract must not only define who pays for
the costs contained within each respective heading, but who controls
the costs.233 A JCI policy that does not allow the insurer to control
settlement or the selection of counsel leaves a lot of leverage in the
hands of the insured, even if she has to pay the litigation costs.234 An
LCI policy that only pays the bills sent in by the lawyers but does
not control their expenses or the settlement decision, similarly
leaves the insurer at the mercy of the insured, even if the insured
has to pay the judgment costs.235 So it is not a surprise that
insurers, who often sell JCI and LCI in the same package, typically
demand control over the selection of counsel and settlement, as well
as other major incidents of control, when defending their insured.236
JCI and LCI are sold together because JCI insurers want to
control the litigation that may result in a judgment they will have
to pay.237 The fact that they also offer to pay for the litigation
expenses through LCI is an artifact of the insurer’s demand of
control over the litigation. In exchange, it is easy to see why the
insureds would demand that the insurers pay for the litigation they
seek to control. In other words, it is a matter of contract law. From
this conclusion, once a default contract is established, alternatives,
which vary the degree of control over litigation that may occur (or
the selection of the counsel, how much they spend, et cetera), could
be sold at prices that reflected the modification’s value to each
party. Directors and officers liability insurance, for example, is
232. By “judgment” insurance, I mean settlements as well, which are negotiated in the
shadow of the threat of adverse judgments which the insured and their insurer must pay. LCI
is what insureds claim when they sue insurers for a breach of the “duty to defend.” See, e.g.,
James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer’s Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insurance
Co. Transformed Liability Insurance into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141,
144-45 (1991).
233. See Silver, supra note 11, at 1594.
234. See id. at 1394-96.
235. See id.
236. See Davenport v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 927, 931-32 (5th Cir. 1992)
(discussing the right of the insurer “to assume control of the defense of an action against the
insured to the exclusion of the latter” and that “the same right that an insurer exercises in
its settlement negotiations is exercisable by it in its choice of counsel”).
237. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 210, at 264-65.
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different from most other third-party liability insurance because
although the insurer sells both JCI and LCI, the insurer does not
take the same control over the litigation against its insureds.238 The
insurer keeps the right to settle within policy limits, which for the
insured is a power they would happily give the insurer, but on all
other matters the insured is in control.239 Why boards allow mana-
gers to buy this kind of insurance is another question entirely, as is
whether regulators should permit the insurance product to be
sold.240 Similarly, why claimholders want to sell party control and
whether regulators should permit liability insurers to demand that
claimholders sell their control are policy questions that are distinct
from the relevant legal question: whether the common law currently
permits such wide variations over party control.241 Clearly, the
common law permits such variations.
When courts have permitted insureds to alienate control over liti-
gation, the courts understand exactly what they are permitting and
the motives behind the parties’ request. As the Supreme Court of
Missouri observed in In re Allstate Insurance Co., under the typical
third-party liability insurance contract,
238. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1814 (2007). 
239. Id. (“D&O insurance contracts give policyholders the right to choose defense counsel
and manage their own defense at the insurer’s expense, subject only to the dollar limits of the
policy and the requirement that defense costs be reasonable.”). The fact that D&O (Directors
and Officers) policies are purchased by corporate officers and directors with minimal
monitoring by the parties who pay for it—the shareholder—may explain why this form of
insurance is unlike any other. As Baker and Griffith point out, the incentives of the insurer
and the agent/beneficiaries align towards an insurance contract that gives the agent/benefici-
ary control over litigation costs since the insurer is more than happy to sell such a policy
(which is priced consequently higher) and the agent/beneficiary is happy to spend the
principal’s money to pay for it. See id. at 1832-33.
240. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 498, 502
(2007).
241. Certainly there are those who argue that in various circumstances, leaving this
question to the market is not good policy. Insurer control over insured’s claims may lead to
undercompensation of deserving tort plaintiffs. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for
Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence,
13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193-94 (2008). Insured control over their own claims may
lead to more tortious conduct. See, e.g., TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 135-36, 142-
45 (2010).
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[t]he insurer has the contract right to direct the litigation
against [the] insured. It may evaluate claims and decide
whether to settle.... It may make economic decisions without the
assent of the insured. The insured may want a quick settlement
to eliminate further demands on time and energy, but the
insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is
forthcoming. Or the insurer may accept a settlement offer even
though the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from
fault. The insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what
discovery is to be had, and what experts to hire. It also has the
right to select counsel to defend its interests.242
Liability insurance involves a series of trade-offs between the
contract parties, and as Charles Silver notes, “There is a downside
to exclusive [insurance] company control.”243 These downsides have
been exemplified by several cases.244 It is well understood that
unless carefully monitored, insurance companies may take advan-
tage of the control that comes with the coverage they sell. The
insurer has an incentive to sacrifice the insured’s interests after
litigation has begun (and after the bulk of the insurance premiums
have been collected). Courts have developed various doctrines to
protect the insured; the most significant is the duty to settle in good
faith.245
The duty of good faith is entailed by the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has
been read into insurance policies by modern courts.246 The duty of
good faith can come into play throughout the performance of the
insurance contract by the insured, and it would include any conduct
by the insurer during the insured’s litigation that damages “the very
242. 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (footnote omitted).
243. Silver, supra note 11, at 1597.
244. See, e.g., Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
insurance company’s appointed defense attorney took advantage of the insured by “actively
working to protect [the insurance company] ... and persisting in manipulating [the insured]
... against her own best interests”); Rosenzweig v. Blinshteyn, 544 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (App.
Div. 1989) (defense counsel appointed by the insurance carrier adopted a defense to avoid the
payment of any monies by the insurance company, regardless of the consequences to the
insureds who were his “ostensible clients”).
245. See W. E. Shipley, Duty of Liability Insurer to Settle or Compromise, 40 A.L.R.2d 168,
178 (1988); Syverud, supra note 100, at 1116.
246. See, e.g., Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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protection or security which the insured sought to gain by buying
insurance.”247 Although in theory, under some set of facts, an
insurer could harm the interests of an insured even where it settled
a claim against the insured within policy limits (leaving the insured
with no financial exposure), in practice, courts have rejected claims
of the breach of the duty of good faith where the insurer settled
within policy limits.248 Following Charles Silver and Kent Syverud,
I will call these “full coverage cases.” A claim of bad faith in a full
coverage case turns on the insured’s uncompensated injuries that
result from the insurer’s decision to settle the lawsuit (sometimes
over the insured’s objection) and pay the entire amount of the
settlement.249 Full coverage cases are, therefore a useful place to
test the limits, if any, which courts place on the alienation of control
of litigation by insureds. In a full coverage case, an insured (or some
other party) is asking a court to set aside a contract provision that
gave the insurer control over the litigation, and the conflict is not
over the amount of the settlement, but how the litigation is being
conducted—that is, whether to settle at all.250 In other words, the
conflict is over the things that the insurer paid to have covered in
the LCI, not the JCI—control over legal strategy and tactics, pure
and simple.
In full coverage cases, insurance contracts are upheld as written,
and without the slightest hesitation by the courts. The fact pattern
that usually gives rise to challenges to insurer control of settlement
involves doctors who object to their insurer settling medical
malpractice claims within policy limits. Doctors often feel personally
attacked when they are sued in medical malpractice and they
believe, whether correctly or not, that settlements (if publicly
known) injure their reputations.251 Even if they are told that
settlements arranged by their insurer will be sealed or protected
from public access, doctors may try to insist on going to trial. They
may feel that the allegations against them, unless categorically
247. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc). The implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century. See
Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914).
248. See Syverud, supra note 100, at 1159.
249. See Silver & Syverud, supra note 210, at 263.
250. See id. at 263-64.
251. See Eric Helland & Gia Lee, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Website: Disclosure’s
Impact on Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 462, 466 (2010).
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rejected by a court, impugn their professional (and perhaps
personal) character.252 What doctors discover, once they are sued is
that, “like auto liability policies, medical malpractice insurance
policies for doctors typically give the insurer complete control over
the defense and settlement of the claim.”253 As one commentator
stated, “These individuals have, of course, an option. They can
defend at their own expense or they can bargain for ‘consent to
settle’ provisions.”254 The standard liability insurance contract does
not require an insurer to go to trial or to pursue some other
nonmonetary remedy (such as a public statement exonerating the
doctor by the patient) if it settles within policy limits.255
The broad scope of control allowed under the standard liability
insurance contract can be seen in Hurvitz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.256 The insureds (a physician and his wife) sued their
former business partner (another physician) on various civil claims
252. It is likely that the resistance by doctors to settlements in cases they feel are
meritless—even if it costs them nothing financially—is something other people feel in other
contexts. A driver might feel equally upset about a decision by her insurer to settle what, in
the drivers’ mind, is a groundless claim in which she did nothing wrong.
The policyholder wishes to contest liability, perhaps to avoid the stigma of
responsibility or the economic consequences of a finding of fault. A defense
limited to the issue of damages may be perceived by the policyholder as an
acknowledgment of legal responsibility. For some individuals such an admission
may be difficult to make even in the face of clear evidence of fault. Some
individuals can live with the vagaries of life. They will accept the decision to
focus the litigation on minimizing the loss even though it means admitting, or
being understood as admitting, responsibility for conduct they do not actually
believe was legally wrongful. Other individuals will find such conduct morally
and emotionally repugnant.
Fischer, supra note 11, at 40 (footnote omitted).
253. Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers
Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1436 (2013).
254. Fischer, supra note 11, at 40. A “consent to settle” provision gives the insured control
over whether to settle, but not the conduct of the litigation in other regards. Syverud, supra
note 100, at 1175-76. Baker and Swedloff observe that consent to settle provisions, which
insurers had freely offered (for a price) are disappearing as medical malpractice insurers seek
new ways to “regulate” the conduct of physicians. See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 253, at
1436.
255. Syverud, supra note 100, at 1159; see Webb v. Witt, 876 A.2d 858, 867 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005) (absence of a consent to settle clause is not against public policy because
“[p]resumably, the premium paid to the insurer reflects the presence or absence of a consent
to settle clause”).
256. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 705 (Ct. App. 2003). The analysis of Hurvitz and the accom-
panying footnotes are drawn substantially from my previous article, Sebok, supra note 5.
890 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:833
including defamation and intentional interference with contractual
relationships.257 The insureds were also subject to various counter-
claims.258 The insurer provided an attorney for all the claims except
the intentional interference with contractual relationships (which
it claimed was not within the scope of the policy’s coverage).259 The
insurer agreed to a global settlement with the former partner
dismissing all claims, including the intentional interference with
contractual relationships and the counterclaims.260 The settlement
was secured by the insurer over the objections of the insureds.261
The insureds sued the insurer, claiming that the settlement was
favorable to the insurer and not favorable to the insureds.262 The
insureds also claimed that the insurer forced the insureds to accept
the settlement by refusing to pay invoices of their independent
defense counsel.263 The trial court dismissed and the court of appeals
upheld the dismissal.264 The court conceded that the settlement
imposed by the insurer harmed the insureds by exposing the
insureds to unwanted media attention and cutting off their opportu-
nity to pursue potentially valid counterclaims.265 It held that these
harms were the normal risks assumed by any insured who buys
liability insurance.266 The court said:
257. Hurvitz, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705-06.
258. Id.
259. The insureds retained their own attorney to defend the intentional interference with
contractual relationships claim. Id.
260. Id. at 707.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 708. According to the insureds, the settlement allegedly impaired the insureds’
negotiating position, caused injury to their reputation, precluded them from filing a malicious
prosecution action against their former partner, provided funds to the former partner to use
to finance his defense of future lawsuits brought by the insureds, deprived the insureds of
insurance financing for their future litigation against the former partner, and impacted the
insureds’ future insurability. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 712.
266. Id. (“The decision to settle rather than continue litigation invariably involves a conflict
between the desire to vindicate oneself and the desire to minimize the costs of litigation and
avoid the risk of loss. Defendants who settle face an uphill battle in convincing others,
including members of the interested public or the media, that they were completely innocent
of the charges. Moreover, when a defendant pays money or gives up something of value to
settle a claim, he or she loses the ability to later pursue a malicious prosecution claim.”).
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[T]hese are the ordinary consequences of settlement.... Liability
insurance exists primarily to protect the insured’s finances. The
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to
minimize the possibility of an award that exceeds the policy’s
limits—it does not require the insurer to fight a legal action
until the bitter end when the costs of defense exceed the benefit
to be achieved.267
The court noted the ironic twist in the insureds’ complaint: the
insureds “put[ ] a reverse spin” on the bad faith doctrine. Instead of
arguing that the insurer breached the duty of good faith when it
unreasonably refused to settle a case within policy limits, the in-
sureds argued that the duty of good faith required the insurer to
refuse any settlement which did not meet all of the insureds’ legal
interests—including a settlement which protected the insureds from
an excess judgment.268 The court reiterated the principle, which has
been the focal point of this Article, that the law allows the complete
alienation of an insured’s party control as long as the insured is not
exposed to an excess liability judgment.269 The law does not require
the insurer to take into account “the entire range of the insured’s
well-being;” it only requires the insurer to take into account the
monetary judgment at risk in the claim against the insured.270 The
insurer, by contract, has unfettered discretion to handle that claim
as long as policy limits are not in play.271 Other cases have said the
same thing.272
267. Id. at 713.
268. Id. at 711 (citing W. Polymer Tech., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78
(1995)).
269. Id. at 712.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Shuster v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist. Physicians’ Prof’l Liab. Ins. Trust, 591 So.
2d 174, 176-77 (Fla. 1992) (“[T]he insured was put on notice that the agreement granted the
insurer the exclusive authority to control settlement and to be guided by its own self-interest
when settling the claim for amounts within the policy limits.”); Jon Epstein, Liability of
Insurer to Insured For Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment
to Insured, 18 A.L.R. 5th 474, 507-08 (1994).
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CONCLUSION
The title of this Article needs some further explication. In truth,
litigation investment does not raise control issues nearly as much
as its critics claim.273 The purpose of this Article has been to begin
with the most extreme version of litigation investment painted by
its critics and to ask, even if that picture were accurate, is there
anything about it that offends the rule of law or the values of
common law adjudication? In this Article, I have argued that the
rule-of-law argument that is often used to such great rhetorical
effect—that litigation investment allows strangers to take control
of parties’ lawsuits—would be underwhelming even if it were true.
It turns out that in important parts of the common law, control over
litigation is regularly alienated.274 This fact alone should give us
pause as to how seriously to take the rule-of-law arguments made
by litigation investment’s critics.
Two further lessons can be drawn from this Article. The first is
that we should not ignore the very specific pattern of outcomes that
emerges from a review of the common law’s acceptance of the
alienation of control over litigation. It is not my claim that the
common law always had a liberal attitude toward the commodifica-
tion of litigation. My claim is quite the opposite—the history of the
common law reveals a clear evolution in the courts from a world
informed by Blackstonian attitudes that were decidedly non-market
273. Consumer litigation investment funders cannot exercise control over the cases in
which they invest, since the contingent fee attorney—who in virtually all cases preexisted the
funding—controls the case. Commercial litigation investment funding is a different story. In
theory, funders could demand explicit control and entrench that control in their contracts.
However, just like—and perhaps for the same reasons as—commercial lenders, commercial
litigation investment funders do not seek enforceable contract rights to control major aspects
of the litigation they fund. See, e.g., Letter from Burford Group LLC to ABA Comm’n on Ethics
20/20 (Feb. 15, 2011), in Comments: Issues Paper Concerning Lawyer’s Involvement in
Alternative Litigation Financing, A.B.A., at 29, 33, available at http://perma.cc/5C7V-K56T
(“Burford does not hire or fire the lawyers, direct strategy or make settlement decisions.
Instead, Burford is a purely passive provider of non-recourse financing to a corporate party.”);
Letter from Juridica Capital Mgmt. (US) Inc. to ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 17, 2011),
in Comments: Alternative Litigation Financing Working Group Issues Paper, A.B.A., at 66, 72,
available at http://perma.cc/5C7V-K56T (“We do not seek to control any of the decisions
regarding the conduct of any litigation that we finance, nor are we aware of any other supplier
in this market segment who does.”).
274. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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oriented to a world grounded in the Benthamite premise that litiga-
tion is nothing more than welfare maximization through the courts.
We cannot ignore the fact that modern accident law and the insur-
ance industry could not exist without the changes in the law of
subrogation and third-party liability contract detailed above, and
that those changes clearly illustrate how jurisprudential attitudes
about law bend in the face of social necessity.275
In 1920, Holdsworth demonstrated how the prohibition on the
assignment of choses of action was gradually hollowed out from
within, until the exceptions swallowed the rule.276 His explanation
for the inexorable move towards the modern rule of free assignabili-
ty was that “the common law was induced to connive at the
introduction and extension of this evasion of its principle[s] ... by
considerations of mercantile convenience or necessity.”277 In 1936,
Radin demonstrated how an exception to the prohibition of
champerty was created out of whole cloth to allow for the contin-
gency fee.278 His explanation for the inexorable move towards the
modern rule of allowing lawyers to take a share of the recovery in
a lawsuit was that “the growth of contingent fees coincided with the
rapid increase of actions for negligence which accompanied the
multiplication of new forms of rapid transportation [as well as] the
... widespread feeling that the safety of passengers and ordinary
pedestrians ought to be insured by transportation companies.”279 In
each of these developments, critics raised formal barriers of the
275. The idea that changes in doctrine made the development of certain economically
desirable features of modern society (such as insurance) possible, is not a controversial claim.
All I am doing here is acknowledging law’s instrumentalist relationship between itself and
the larger society, especially economic institutions. See William J. Novak, Law, Capitalism,
and the Liberal State: The Historical Sociology of James Willard Hurst, 18 LAW & HIST. REV.
97, 122 (2000) (discussing Hurst’s legal instrumentalism). I am not taking a position on the
more controversial question of whether changes in legal concepts in some way “cause” certain
economic institutions to arise, or create the conditions for such institutions to arise, or were
a result of social forces independent of the legal system. See John Fabian Witt, Toward a New
History of American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party
Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 693 n.7 (2001) (suggesting that, in contrast with
his method, Morton Horwitz focused more on “intellectual currents in tort law theory rather
than on the role of tort law in the great social struggles of the day”).
276. Holdsworth, supra note 120, at 997-98.
277. Id. at 1021-22.
278. Radin, supra note 40, at 71.
279. Id.
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common law’s established principles to block them, notwithstanding
their social utility.280
Litigation investment stands in the same place now that the law
of assignment and the law of lawyer champerty stood before.
Objections based on abstract theories about how litigation must be
structured are being raised in order to slow down or reverse the
growth of litigation investment. Once claims about party control
based on theoretical or formal concerns have been rejected, litiga-
tion investment’s critics will have to frame their opposition entirely
in terms of social costs and benefits. The argument that litigation
finance will produce major social costs is a thinly-veiled repetition
of claims already made against entrepreneurial plaintiff lawyering
in general.281 This Article is not intended to take up the social cost
argument, but will touch on it briefly here.
In response to the argument that litigation investment will cost
society dearly, one only needs to look to the publications by scholars
and policymakers who have argued that litigation investment has
the potential to increase social welfare, and conversely that there is
little reason to believe that it will cause a loss in social welfare.282
Scholarship in this vein ranges from law and economic analyses
showing that litigation investment will generate efficient settle-
ments by helping parties to price their claims accurately283 to
arguments that litigation investment will help underserved
populations have more secure and adequate compensation for the
wrongs they have suffered.284
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on America’s Global
Competitiveness: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 49-51 (2011) (testimony of John H. Beisner, U.S. Chamber Institute
for Legal Reform) (stating that in addition to the loss of party control, the other arguments
against litigation investment are: (i) reducing plaintiff’s recovery; (ii) increasing frivolous
litigation; and (iii) unnecessarily prolonging litigation at the expense of the plaintiff).
282. See Michele DeStefano, Claim Finders and Commercial Claim Holders: A Common
Interest or a Common Problem?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2014); Keith Hylton, Toward
a Regulatory Framework for Third-Party Funding of Litigation, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 537-
39 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 582-85 (2014); Susan Lorde Martin, The
Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 67-72 (2004); Molot, supra note 227, at 407-11; Molot, supra
note 7, at 107. See generally Steinitz, supra note 25.
283. See generally Hylton, supra note 282; Molot, supra note 227; Molot, supra note 7.
284. See generally Martin, supra note 282; Steinitz, supra note 25.
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Recently the President of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, Lord Neuberger, reviewed the gradual shift in English
law from prohibiting to encouraging litigation investment.285 The
common law’s prohibition of litigation investment, Neuberger ar-
gues, was based on the circumstances of its times, which required
the new court system and an economy that was emerging out of
feudalism to be protected against the abuse of litigation by powerful
aristocrats.286 But as the circumstances of the judicial system and
the economy changed, so did the need for prohibitions on litigation
investment.287 As the English Court of Appeals noted in 1895, the
rules concerning litigation investment “do[ ] not appear to be found-
ed so much on general principles of right and wrong or of natural
justice as on considerations of public policy.”288 Neuberger notes that
by the nineteenth century, the prohibitions on litigation investment
themselves imposed costs on English society:
It is ... ironic. The original, medieval, rationale for the prohibi-
tions was to protect the poor and weak from exploitation by the
rich and powerful.... The later, 19th century, rationale was, in
practice if not in theory, to the opposite effect: a person had to be
independently wealthy to bring a case to court.... Their effect
was, to borrow Bentham’s conclusion, to give wealth the “monop-
oly of justice against poverty.”289
As of 2013, Lord Neuberger observes that the argument concern-
ing litigation investment “has come full circle”: anyone concerned
with the promotion of the rule of law should “positively ... support
the development of litigation funding, as a means of securing
effective access to justice.”290
The second lesson to be drawn from this Article can be stated
quite briefly. Just as the courts accommodated new attitudes toward
285. Neuberger, supra note 12.
286. Id. at 9-10.
287. Id. at 10.
288. Id. at 13 (quoting Alabaster v. Harness, [1895] 1 Q.B. 339 at 342 (Eng.)).
289. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 20-21. Radin said the same thing eighty years earlier: “The shoe is really on the
other foot. If in medieval England, powerful men oppressed their weaker fellow subjects by
maintaining suits against them, in modern society powerful people are more likely to achieve
their ends by daring their victims to maintain suits.” Radin, supra note 40, at 77-78.
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the alienation of control of litigation in insurance law, so should
courts accommodate the alienation of control of litigation in
litigation investment—assuming that some social benefit results. In
response to the real risks caused by the transfer of party control to
vulnerable parties, insurance law developed protective doctrines,
such as the tort of bad faith and the make-whole doctrine, which in
coordination with more liberal attitudes toward contract enforce-
ment provide a balance that fits the needs of society. If such a
balance could be achieved with insurance law, there is no reason to
think that the same could not be achieved with third-party invest-
ment in litigation.
The fact that insurance law is the primary lens through which the
argument of this Article has been made is not a coincidence. Like
the litigation investment contract, the insurance contract is a social
instrument.291 Seeing insurance as a social instrument means that
insurance law is not a two-step process in which the legal meaning
of the contract is first determined using value-free legal tools, and
then second, the contract’s scope is either fully enforced or limited
based on the court’s non-legal, public policy preferences.292 Instead,
thinking about the types of social problems the insurance contract
at issue was meant to solve provides an expanded menu of reasons
with which to interpret the contract.293 Although Jeff Stempel was
not thinking specifically about the sale of party control when he
applied his approach to various insurance contract disputes, we can
see that his approach fits the judicial treatment of the contract
terms examined above in disputes over control in subrogation—full
coverage cases and litigation investment. In each of these, the
reason for enforcing the contract was twofold. First, the main risks,
which the contracts were designed to mitigate, were not increased
or exacerbated by the sale of party control. Second, the sale of party
control was arguably the least expensive way for the party providing
funds (the insurer or the investor) to mitigate the risk that the other
party (the insured or the claimant) would abandon the joint project
that the contract created.
291. See Stempel, supra note 12, at 1495-99.
292. Id. at 1582.
293. The “social instrument factor ... complements rather than supplants traditional con-
tract analysis.” Id.
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So what do we say to critics who point out that litigation finance
contracts might become a vehicle for socially wasteful litigation?
The answer must be that absent evidence to the contrary, the risk
of abuse must be permitted and dealt with in some other fashion. In
reflecting on the persistence of the rules prohibiting litigation
investment, Radin speculated that “[i]t is indubitably easier to
reject all [champertous] agreements ... in bulk or to accept them in
bulk.”294 But, Radin noted, this is not an attitude toward law that
we should encourage.295 The appropriate response to the fact that
some litigation investment contracts may be used for improper
purposes or end up supporting groundless litigation is not to abolish
litigation investment, but to develop, as we have in other useful
areas of legal innovation, better processes of law.296
294. Radin, supra note 40, at 78.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 72 (“If champertous contracts can serve any good purpose—and they apparently
can—it is not foresight, but the infantile psychosis of ‘all-or-nothing’ which demands that we
discard them altogether.”).

